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I. INTRODUCTION 
The third sector deserves a second look.
1
 The importance of nonprofits 
is intensifying around the globe. Nonprofit organizations are essential to 
the effective management of society‘s goals and priorities, both in the 
United States and abroad. Catastrophes and challenges unresolved by 
governments and for-profit businesses increasingly demand the 
contributions of charitable institutions.
2
 The third sector has come into its 
own. 
Despite the prominence of many American nonprofit institutions, the 
growing recognition of the field of nonprofit law as a distinct area of study 
and practice is a relatively recent trend.
3
 In 2006, a proposal was made to 
the American Association of Law Schools to create a new section on 
Nonprofit and Philanthropy Law.
4
 In 2007, a blog for law professors 
specializing in nonprofit law was established.
5
 In 2009, the American 
College of Trusts and Estates Counsel sponsored a symposium entitled 
―The Law of Philanthropy in the 21st Century.‖6 The momentum 
gathering behind the movement to recognize and analyze nonprofit law as 
a discrete area of legal study offers a rare opportunity to improve that field 
by encouraging an international perspective. As part of its growing 
commitment to examine and improve the state of nonprofit law in 
America, legal scholarship should embrace a comparative law approach.
7
 
 
 
 1. The first sector is government; the second sector is business; the third sector is philanthropy. 
See ROBERT L. PAYTON & MICHAEL P. MOODY, UNDERSTANDING PHILANTHROPY: ITS MEANING AND 
MISSION 46–52 (2008). The ―third sector‖ is also defined as ―the voluntary and community sector, the 
non-profit sector, the social enterprise sector and civil society.‖ Stephen P. Osborne, Key Issues for the 
Third Sector in Europe, in THE THIRD SECTOR IN EUROPE: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES 3, 6 n.1 
(Stephen P. Osborne ed., 2008). 
 2. Nonprofits played a significant role in responding to the Haitian earthquake. See Stephanie 
Strom, Haitian Quake Brings More Money and Scrutiny to a Charity, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2010, at 
A17. The American Red Cross received over $100 million in pledges to respond to the crisis. 
Stephanie Strom, A Deluge of Donations via Text Messages, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2010, at A1. 
 3. See Lizabeth A. Moody, Revising the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act: Plus Ca Change, 
Plus C’est la Meme Chose, 41 GA. L. REV. 1335, 1337 (2005) (―Until recently, nobody thought much 
about laws pertaining to nonprofit corporations, and for that matter, no one thought much about 
nonprofit corporations.‖). 
 4. See Letter from David A. Brennen, Ellison C. Palmer Professor of Tax Law, to the 
Committee on Sections for the Association of American Law Schools (Feb. 6, 2006), available at 
http://www.philanthropy.iupui.edu/about/aals/aals_petition.html. 
 5. See generally Nonprofit Law Prof Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/nonprofit/2007/ 
week48/index.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2011). 
 6. The symposium was co-sponsored and hosted by the Chicago-Kent School of Law; the 
program can be found at http://www.cklawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/PROGRAMFINAL 
COLOR.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2011). 
 7. Many scholars in other disciplines and countries do embrace an international approach to the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss1/3
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Emphasizing a comparative approach to nonprofit law is essential for a 
thorough conception of the field.
8
 The need for an understanding of 
international law and comparative perspectives has long been recognized,
9
 
but its importance is growing exponentially.
10
 The world‘s economies are 
increasingly intertwined, with the growth of travel and worldwide 
communication capabilities fostering cross-national interaction.
11
 We are 
no longer ―largely independent societies,‖ but have instead evolved into a 
―multicultural, interdependent, interconnected collective.‖12 Globalization 
has impacted American courts and nearly every sector of our society.
13
 
Comparative law approaches also offer benefits for law students.
14
 A 
great variety of legal systems and cultures exist throughout society, which 
reveal several different ways to handle the same issues.
15
 Analyzing the 
 
 
study of the third sector. The International Society for Third-Sector Research, where this Article was 
presented in the summer of 2010, provides one avenue for such collaboration. See INT‘L SOC‘Y FOR 
THIRD-SECTOR RESEARCH, http://www.istr.org (last visited Jan. 21, 2011). Significant amounts of 
international research on nonprofits also have been accomplished through the Johns Hopkins Center 
for Civil Society Studies Project; see CTR. FOR CIVIL SOC‘Y STUDIES, http://www.ccss.jhu.edu/ (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2011). 
 8. Also essential to a thorough understanding of the third sector is an interdisciplinary approach. 
Law, although a key element of the structure of nonprofits, has no monopoly on the study of 
nonprofits. A thorough understanding of charitable organizations requires contributions by scholars of 
government, public policy, and many social science disciplines. This Article relies upon such an 
interdisciplinary group of contributors. 
 9. See, e.g., JAMES KENT, 1 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 20 (2d ed. 1832) (―I think I 
cannot be mistaken in considering the elementary learning of the law of nations, as not only an 
essential part of the education of an American lawyer, but as proper to be academically taught.‖); see 
also THEODORE D. WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 355 (4th ed. 
1874) (―[E]very educated person ought to become acquainted with international law because he is a 
responsible member of the body politic and . . . because the executive if not controlled will be tempted 
to assume the province of international law for us.‖). 
 10. On the importance of the study of international law generally, see Myres S. McDougal, The 
Impact of International Law Upon National Law: A Policy-Oriented Perspective, 4 S.D. L. REV. 25, 
35–36 (1959).  
 11. John A. Barrett, Jr., International Legal Education in the United States: Being Educated for 
Domestic Practice While Living in a Global Society, 12 AM. U. J. INT‘L L. & POL‘Y 975, 981–82 
(1997).  
 12. Id. at 981. 
 13. See Javier H. Rubinstein, International Law's New Importance in the U.S., NAT'L L.J., Sept. 
15, 2003, at 16 (noting the increasing frequency with which the U.S. Supreme Court has begun to refer 
to international law in reaching its decisions). 
 14. Barrett, Jr., supra note 11, at 983–85. One ―important reason to study comparative law is the 
skills it provides.‖ Id. at 984. Any lawyer practicing in the 21st century can expect to encounter 
international legal issues at least occasionally throughout a career. See Jorge A. Ramirez, International 
Law Impacts Texas and the Texas Tech School of Law Responds, 35 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 265, 266 
(2004) (―Legal institutions across the country, including the United States Supreme Court, are 
becoming progressively more aware of the importance of global issues and likewise acknowledge the 
need to make certain that future lawyers understand where, when, and how domestic law and 
international law merge and diverge.‖). 
 15. Barrett, Jr., supra note 11, at 985. 
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diversity of approaches may foster creative skills and contribute to a 
greater commitment to understanding the problems—the issues critical to 
a client—rather than the nuances of a ―particular legal regime.‖16 
The purpose of this Article is to examine nonprofit organizations from 
such an international perspective, and to cross-pollinate the fields of third-
sector research and international law. A law review article can provide 
only a broad introduction to this genre, but is an important step in the 
integration of these fields. My hope is that this Article will provide a 
glimpse for these groups into each others‘ worlds such that (1) scholars 
and students of international law might recognize the important role of the 
third sector, and (2) scholars and students of nonprofit studies might 
recognize the contribution of a comparative legal approach.
17
 
This Article is novel in its breadth, and intentionally so. Most 
comparative law articles choose depth over breadth, focusing on the 
details of how one or two countries‘ approaches to a legal issue are 
distinguishable from the American system.
18
 Although this technique is 
useful, it is only through the cumulative impact of many different 
approaches that true idiosyncrasies become obvious. This Article therefore 
provides a window into not one, but nine alternative international 
approaches to nonprofit law. It is against this relief that American 
distinctiveness glares. 
This Article begins with an introduction to the colorful variety of 
approaches to nonprofit regulation that the international community 
affords, analyzing the nonprofit sector in several countries in Europe 
(France, Germany, Italy, and Sweden) and in Asia (India, Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka). The Article next explains the basics of 
American nonprofit law, first discussing state regulation, and then federal 
regulation. The American approach is then contrasted with the systems of 
nonprofit regulation in other countries, and two distinctive themes of 
American law emerge. First, American nonprofit law has a different 
primary relational focus: it regulates the relationship between the 
nonprofit and its donors and leaders, rather than the relationship between 
the nonprofit and the government. Second, American nonprofit law is 
unusually tax-centric in its regulatory scheme: the Treasury is a 
 
 
 16. Id. at 984–85.  
 17. It is my hope that this Article might be useful to law students studying international law, 
perhaps through a study abroad program. While international programs often emphasize the first two 
sectors—government and business—very little attention is given to the third. 
 18. See, e.g., Yolanda Demianczuk, Charity Regulation in the Russian Federation, 35 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT‘L L. 477 (1997). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss1/3
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questionable locus of regulation for nonprofits, and most other countries 
use tax only as a supplemental, rather than central, regulatory force. The 
Article concludes with a call for greater attention to international and 
interdisciplinary approaches to the third sector. 
II. EUROPEAN AND ASIAN NONPROFIT LAW  
A. The Third Sector in Europe 
Nonprofit organizations in Europe offer an informative foil to the 
American approach. Although some regions share similar outlooks on the 
role of the third sector, each country—with its unique history and 
government—contributes to notable variety throughout Europe.19 France, 
Italy, Germany, and Sweden share a commitment to addressing the 
challenges of the third sector, but they differ as to their regulatory 
structures.
20
 The following introduction to the world of nonprofits in 
Europe demonstrates how several countries monitor the dynamic between 
the voluntary sector and governmental control. 
1. France 
In France, the perception of the role of philanthropy and the third 
sector, like many of its European neighbors, is heavily influenced by the 
history of its government.
21
 Following the French Revolution, the right to 
form associations was strictly limited in an attempt to ensure that anti-
democratic guilds would not interfere with individual liberties.
22
 For some 
time, economic and professional associations (as well as clubs, academies, 
and women‘s societies) were banned.23 Modern movements (following the 
French labor and socialist movements) embraced a broader role for 
associations.
24
 There remains a ―tradition of French associationism‖25—a 
history of ―cooperative socialism so closely bound up with the democratic 
 
 
 19. See generally Janelle A. Kerlin, Social Enterprise in the United States and Europe: 
Understanding and Learning from the Differences, 17 VOLUNTAS 247 (2006) (discussing the broad 
differences among the American and European nonprofit sector). 
 20. For a thorough discussion of nonprofit endeavors in many countries throughout Europe, see 
generally THE THIRD SECTOR IN EUROPE (Adalbert Evers & Jean-Louis Laville eds., 2004).  
 21. On the French third sector generally, see Philippe Chanial & Jean-Louis Laville, French Civil 
Society Experiences: Attempts to Bridge the Gap Between Political and Economic Dimensions, in THE 
THIRD SECTOR IN EUROPE, supra note 20, at 83–99. 
 22. Id. at 84. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 85–88. 
 25. Id. at 83. 
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republican movement‖26—that continues to influence French notions of 
how citizens should support each other and themselves through a 
commitment to solidarity. 
Nonprofit associations were recognized in France by the Act of 1901.
27
 
Most French nonprofit organizations belong to one of three categories: 
cooperatives, mutuals, and associations.
28
 Cooperatives are organizations 
that provide resources in areas where for-profit industries are relatively 
weak.
29
 They are part of the market economy, distinctively competitive, 
and regulated by the state.
30
 Cooperatives tend to focus their mission on 
specialized concerns and often prioritize long-term sustainability of the 
organization over furthering dramatic political change.
31
 Mutuals are 
organizations established by individuals with common concerns and 
risks.
32
 Mutuals often address issues of loss of health, life, or work, and 
tend to be supported by individuals who share a profession, location, or 
other commonality that inspires solidarity within the group.
33
 For-profit 
insurance companies are sometimes direct competitors with mutuals, and 
may interfere with their successful operation.
34
 Associations are nonprofit 
organizations designed to provide social services. Because of the relatively 
high degree of governmental regulation—and the reliance upon the 
government rather than individual donations for financial support—
associations tend to be very centralized, with a few strong united national 
organizations, rather than many smaller entities.
35
  
French philanthropy embraces the notion of solidarity and supports 
self-organization and association as a mechanism for assuaging the 
injuries of the market economy.
36
 Association through voluntary 
involvement in nonprofit organizations is an opportunity to express a 
 
 
 26. Id. at 98 n.1. 
 27. Chanial & Laville, supra note 21, at 90. 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id.  
 30. Id.  
 31. Id.  
 32. Id.  
 33. Chanial & Laville, supra note 21, at 90–91. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 91. France introduced the ―societe co-operative d‘interet collectif‖ (cooperative society 
of collective interest) in 2001. Janelle A. Kerlin, Social Enterprise in the United States and Abroad: 
Learning from Our Differences, in RESEARCH ON SOCIAL ENTREPENEURSHIP, ARNOVA OCCASIONAL 
PAPER SERIES NO. 1.3, at 8, 16–17 (Rachel Mosher-Williams ed., 2006), available at http://www. 
nationalcne.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=feature.display&feature_id=141&CFID=737&CFTOKEN=908
49585 (noting that in the French system ―[p]rofits can be made but nonprofit status prohibits the 
accumulation of surpluses beyond those needed for day-to-day use‖). 
 36. See Chanial & Laville, supra note 21, at 83–84. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss1/3
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commitment to democratic ideals and to moderate the ―threat from the 
assertiveness of the market‖ with deliberate social intervention.37 
Nonprofit organizations contribute to ―democratization of the economy‖ 
by ensuring that social goals aside from economic growth are not 
completely overshadowed by the ―monetarization and commercialization 
of everyday life‖ that the markets alone would engender.38 The market 
economy functions as the initial distribution channel of the exchange of 
goods and services; the third sector integrates notions of redistribution or 
reciprocity, resulting in a more just allocation of resources.
39
 The French 
third sector, therefore, is acutely aware of its relationship with the second 
sector (private, for-profit industry) as well as the first (the government). 
French tax law allows ―special treatment‖ to nonprofit organizations40 
and provides for certain benefits to those organizations that serve the 
public interest.
41
 In addition to those benefits, French tax law permits 
partial income tax exemptions to those who make monetary contributions 
to charitable organizations.
42
  
The role of the voluntary sector in France today is as strong as ever. 
The movement toward achieving ―economic action through solidarity‖ has 
supported the growth of associations in recent years.
43
 The Act of 1901 
establishing nonprofit associations was well-celebrated upon its 100th 
anniversary, and recent governmental actions (such as the creation of a 
state secretary for the civil and solidarity-based economy) demonstrate the 
growing recognition of the importance of the third sector‘s role.44 
 
 
 37. Id. Nonprofit organizations in France include those formed for political and patriotic 
purposes. Nina J. Crimm, Democratization, Global Grant-Making, and the Internal Revenue Code 
Lobbying Restrictions, 79 TUL. L. REV. 587, 664 n.327 (2005) (noting that such ―associations with 
well-defined declared aims can lobby for legislation with government officials and parliament‖ 
(quoting EDITH ARCHAMBAULT, THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN FRANCE 68, 77–78 (1997))).  
 38. See Chanial & Laville, supra note 21, at 97. 
 39. Id. at 93. 
 40. EDITH ARCHAMBAULT, THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN FRANCE 66–69 (1997). A nonprofit 
organization will not have to pay a corporation tax (the common marginal rate is 37% or 42%) on its 
income as long as the organization meets the qualifications. Id.; see also CODE GÉNÉRAL DES IMPÔTS 
art. 206-1 (Fr.).  
 41. ARCHAMBAULT, supra note 40, at 66. 
 42. Id. at 66, 69–72. Deductions are a relatively recent addition to French tax law. Id. at 69. 
Deductions are only allowed for cash contributions. Id. at 72. Thus, French tax law differs from 
American tax law that allows for property contributions to be deductible.  
 43. See Chanial & Laville, supra note 21, at 97. 
 44. Id. at 96–97. 
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2. Germany 
The German approach to the third sector is distinctive.
45
 The range of 
third-sector organizations is ―extremely varied,‖ and includes small local 
nonprofits, large national or international charities,
46
 organizations that 
provide tangible services, organizations that contribute to the shaping of 
public opinion, organizations that focus on income redistribution and 
charitable endeavors, and organizations that focus on ―social economy,‖ 
like cooperatives and mutuals.
47
  
Nonprofits play a significant role in German society. In 1995, the 
German nonprofit sector comprised 4% of Germany‘s GDP.48 Voluntary 
welfare organizations employ about 3% of all workers.
49
 Volunteers in 
these associations exceed 2.5 million, nearly triple the number of paid 
employees.
50
 That said, Germany relies on a steady source of volunteers 
much less than many of its European neighbors, in part because today‘s 
youth volunteer less frequently than previous generations.
51
 
While all German entities are required to pay corporate income tax, 
these entities ―can be exempted when they pursue qualified philanthropic 
purposes enumerated in the AO (Arts. 52–54 Abgabenordnung).‖52 
German tax law allows individual and corporate income tax deductions for 
contributions ―to certain public benefit organizations.‖53  
 
 
 45. See generally Ingo Bode & Adalbert Evers, From Institutional Fixation to Entrepreneurial 
Mobility? The German Third Sector and Its Contemporary Challenges, in THE THIRD SECTOR IN 
EUROPE, supra note 20, at 101–21. 
 46. There are presently six nationally organized nonprofit welfare federations. See id. at 107. 
 47. Id. at 102. 
 48. Annette Zimmer, Corporatism Revisited—The Legacy of History and the German Nonprofit 
Sector, in THIRD SECTOR POLICY AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERNATIONAL NONPROFIT ANALYSIS 
114, 115 (Helmut K. Anheier & Jeremy Kendall eds., 2001). In 1995, the German nonprofit sector had 
$84 billion total operating expenditures. Id.  
 49. Bode & Evers, supra note 45, at 108. These organizations ―see themselves as struggling for a 
certain economic organization of society, by creating reformatory concepts of a ‗social economy‘ 
beyond market enterprises and the logic of bureaucratic redistribution.‖ Id at 102; see also Zimmer, 
supra note 48, at 115 (finding that the employment in the nonprofit sector comprises 5% of the total 
labor force).  
 50. Bode & Evers, supra note 45, at 108. As of 1996, there were roughly 1 million paid 
employees of nonprofits in Germany. Id.  
 51. Id. at 113. 
 52. COUNCIL ON FOUNDATIONS, U.S. INTERNATIONAL GRANTMAKING—GERMANY 8 (Aug. 
2009), available at http://www.usig.org/ICNL/countryinfo/PDF/Germany.pdf.  
 53. Id. at 8–9. Deductions do have a ceiling limit:  
For contributions made by individuals or corporations, a tax deduction of up to 20 percent is 
possible on yearly taxable income (or 0.4 percent of the sum of the turnover, wages, and 
salaries) if the recipient organization pursues qualifying purposes (Article 10b EStG and 
Article 9 (1) No.2 of KStG). Donations exceeding the deductible limit may be carried forward 
to subsequent fiscal years.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss1/3
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The German notion of nonprofits is perhaps more appropriately 
conceived as an ―intermediary sphere‖ than a ―third sector.‖54 Rather than 
operating independently of the state and market, modern nonprofits share 
commonalities with both business and government sectors, and can even 
operate as ―hybrid‖ organizations.55 Germany‘s nonprofit sector is 
dominated by nonprofits engaged in the fields of healthcare and social 
services.
56
 These organizations are ―to a remarkable extent . . . integrated 
into the system of the German welfare state.‖57 In some instances, the law 
requires governmental support of the nonprofit sector.
58
 German 
nonprofits are characterized by their need to compete and entrepreneurial 
outlook, like for-profit business, but also by their commitment to public 
good and access to resources of the state, like government.
59
 
Unlike many of its European neighbors, Germany‘s cooperatives no 
longer occupy a primary role in the German nonprofit sector. The market 
sector has largely subsumed cooperative nonprofits, which primarily 
operated to support the common needs of workers.
60
 With economic and 
welfare reform considered to be a responsibility for the state, the social 
and moral underpinnings of the cooperatives faded, leaving primarily 
business concerns.
61
  
The most effective German nonprofits are strong in their 
entrepreneurial stance and willing to adapt to changes in environment and 
economics.
62
 Many engage in specific strategies to promote the 
organization‘s success, including linking different types of 
entrepreneurship, encouraging solidarity and publicity, and ―normalizing‖ 
 
 
 In addition, an individual donor can deduct up to €1,000,000 for a donation to the 
endowment of a foundation with qualifying purposes. The deduction can be taken in the year 
of donation and/or divided over the following nine years.  
Id.  
 54. Bode & Evers, supra note 45, at 101. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Zimmer, supra note 48, at 115. Sixty-one percent of the operating expenditures for the 
nonprofit sector are comprised of those nonprofits engaged in healthcare and social services. Id. These 
organizations typically receive revenues in the form of reimbursements from insurance funds, as well 
as governmental subsidies. Id.  
 57. Id. at 114, 116. 
 58. See id. at 114 (observing that ―[e]ven local governments are obliged to subsidize nonprofits 
organizations active in healthcare or social service activities in Germany‖); see also Bode & Evers, 
supra note 45, at 101 (noting ―the high financial commitment of the state and a long-standing public-
private partnership‖).  
 59. Bode & Evers, supra note 45, at 101. 
 60. Id. at 106. Cooperative nonprofits are identified by the terms ―Gemeinwirtschaft‖ or 
―Genonssenschaften.‖ Id. 
 61. Id. at 106. Mutual health insurance organizations, however, still persist. Id. at 107. 
 62. Id. at 114. 
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the provision of welfare services from nonprofit groups.
63
 The future of 
the third sector in Germany is promising, as long as nonprofits remain 
attuned to issues relating to the service culture, how service tasks are 
structured, the role of ―civic and moral commitment,‖ and interaction with 
public authorities.
64
 
3. Italy 
Although Italian philanthropy faced many challenges throughout its 
history, today the third sector is of growing importance in Italian society.
65
 
At the beginning of the new millennium, Italy was home to almost a 
quarter-million nonprofit organizations.
66
 The vast majority of Italian 
nonprofits depend on volunteers; 3.2 million people count themselves as 
volunteers for these nonprofits, and roughly 630,000 are paid workers.
67
 
Only 15.2% of Italian nonprofits have any paid employees; the role of the 
volunteer is paramount.
68
 
Italian nonprofits may exist in a variety of forms, but most (over 91%) 
operate as associations, and the majority of these associations are not 
legally recognized entities.
69
 They address a variety of causes, the most 
common of which are social services, social welfare, health, education, 
research, culture, sports, and recreation.
70
 Many Italian nonprofits are 
social cooperatives, and Italian law recognizes two varieties of these 
cooperatives.
71
 The first type consists of cooperatives that deliver social, 
health and educational services.
72
 The second type produces goods or 
provides non-social services, in order to offer employment opportunities 
for ―disadvantaged workers.‖73 This second type of cooperative must 
 
 
 63. Id. at 115. 
 64. Id. at 116–18. 
 65. See generally Carlo Borzaga, From Suffocation to Re-emergence: The Evolution of the 
Italian Third Sector, in THE THIRD SECTOR IN EUROPE, supra note 20, at 45–62. 
 66. Id. at 59. The data discussed in this section comes from a census of Italian nonprofits 
conducted in 2000 by the National Statistics Institute, and reflects statistics in 1999. Id. There were 
221,412 nonprofits included in the data in 1999.  
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Borzaga, supra note 65, at 55; see also Antonio Thomas, The Rise of Social Cooperatives in 
Italy, 15 VOLUNTAS 243, 243–64 (2004) (providing an overview of social cooperatives in Italy). 
 72. Borzaga, supra note 65, at 55. 
 73. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss1/3
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employ at least 30% ―disadvantaged workers,‖ and may be exempt from 
certain governmental payments related to their employment.
74
 
Italian nonprofit organizational form does not center upon the nonprofit 
distribution constraint like American law does.
75
 The Italian third sector is 
characterized by the less formal and more flexible association and 
cooperative forms.
76
 Scholars have theorized that involvement and 
participation by nonprofit stakeholders and democratic management of 
nonprofits constitute sufficient mechanisms for creating accountable and 
well-functioning charities in Europe, and that the American distribution 
constraint model is not the only solution.
77
  
Although the history of philanthropy in Italy is long and complex, it is 
in many ways a young system, or a recently reborn one. The vast majority 
of nonprofits in Italy are new: as of 2000, over 55% of existing nonprofits 
were less than ten years old, and less than 22% had operated for more than 
twenty years.
78
 
The first Italian law relating to nonprofits was the ―Great Act,‖ Law 
No. 753, passed in 1862.
79
 This law recognized the centuries-old operation 
of Opere Pie, which were charities that supported the poor and provided 
health and social services, and granted significant autonomy to these 
organizations.
80
 Savings banks and provident loan societies were also 
operated as nonprofits throughout much of Italy‘s history.81 Mutual benefit 
societies, which functioned to insure members against unemployment and 
health problems, became very popular late in the 19th century.
82
 Credit 
and consumer cooperatives also were widespread by the 1800s.
83
  
Despite this initial boon for nonprofits, Italy deliberately and 
substantially scaled back the role of its third sector near the beginning of 
the 20th century. Inspired by the French Revolution and the German 
model of social democracy, Italians questioned whether intermediaries like 
nonprofits would ―obstruc[t] the direct relationship between the state and 
the citizen.‖84 The rise of Fascism in the 20th century also operated to 
 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 61 n.6. 
 76. Id. at 55.  
 77. Id. at 45, 61 n.6 (citations omitted). 
 78. Borzaga, supra note 65, at 59. 
 79. Id. at 48. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 49. 
 82. Id.  
 83. Id.  
 84. Borzaga, supra note 65, at 52.  
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greatly eliminate the autonomy and success of nonprofits. It was not until 
the end of the 20th century that the modern Italian third sector emerged.
85
  
Italy was the first European country to introduce legislation that placed 
little to no restrictions on associations participating in commercial 
activities.
86
 These laws aim to ―encourage the entrepreneurial and 
commercial provision of social and welfare services and to increase the 
participation of women in labor markets, whilst involving various 
stakeholders (workers, voluntary workers, target groups, and 
municipalities) in the production process.‖87 This legislation has been 
successful in increasing not only the number of these organizations but 
their benefits to the Italian population.
88
 Although commercial activity is 
allowed, it ―should not be aimed at making a monetary profit, but 
exclusively at obtaining the association‘s purpose. If the commercial 
activities are autonomous in relation to the purpose of the association, it 
may be considered a de facto company with taxation and social 
obligations.‖89 Members of the association do not have the right to share in 
the profits.
90
 
Italy does offer some modest tax benefits to encourage philanthropic 
institutions and their donors, but these benefits are a recent addition rather 
than the centerpiece of national nonprofit law. In 1991, the Act on 
Voluntary Organizations (no. 266) granted tax benefits to certain 
nonprofits and their donors, but delayed implementation of this tax relief 
until 1997.
91
 Arguably, there is still no ―significant‖ tax relief or subsidy to 
support the third sector in Italy.
92
 
4. Sweden 
A person might assume that Sweden, with its reputation for full-scale 
governmental services, has little need for nonprofit organization. On the 
contrary, Sweden has a robust and well-organized charitable sector.
93
 The 
role of the voluntary association is critical, and roughly 90% of the 
 
 
 85. Id.  
 86. Kerlin, supra note 19, at 254. 
 87. Id. (citation omitted).  
 88. Id. 
 89. See Kerlin, supra note 35, at 17. 
 90. See id. 
 91. Borzaga, supra note 65, at 54. 
 92. Id. at 46. 
 93. See generally Victor Pestoff, The Development and Future of the Social Economy in Sweden, 
in THE THIRD SECTOR IN EUROPE, supra note 20, at 63–82. 
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population is a member in at least one voluntary organization.
94
 That said, 
Swedish nonprofits do focus less on provision of services than many other 
European countries.
95
 
The central role voluntary organizations play in Sweden relates to 
shaping public policy. Rather than allocate resources toward the provision 
of social services like several nations do, many of Sweden‘s nonprofits 
focus instead on improving government by providing coordinated 
participation in policy making.
96
 Swedish nonprofits may act as ―pressure 
groups‖ that highlight a group‘s position on potential legislation, and 
undertake activities ranging from lobbying and dissemination of 
information to direct engagement with the drafting or application of 
laws.
97
 The tradition of nonprofit organizations in Sweden is deeply tied to 
a history of civic engagement with popular movements.
98
 
Some Swedish organizations do provide social support, along the lines 
of the American conception of nonprofits. Organizations such as the 
Salvation Army provide shelter and services to the homeless, and groups 
like Alcoholics Anonymous focus on rehabilitation of those with drinking 
problems.
99
 Even these service-focused organizations have a Swedish 
flavor, however, and focus more on the recognition of the rights of 
disadvantaged individuals, rather than the beneficence of those who 
support them.
100
 
The history of the third sector in Sweden is relatively young, with few 
voluntary associations recognized prior to the 1800s.
101
 Before the 
Reformation, charitable endeavors were within the purview of the Church, 
 
 
 94. Id. at 63. 
 95. Id. at 79. 
 96. Id. The ability of Swedish nonprofit organizations to engage in political activities ―can result 
in these organizations ‗focusing on lobbying and acting as pressure groups to influence different levels 
of government to provide services than on actually providing these services themselves.‘‖ Crimm, 
supra note 37, at 664 n.327 (quoting Tommy Lundström & Filip Wijkström, Sweden, in DEFINING THE 
NONPROFIT SECTOR: A CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS 215, 241 (Lester M. Salomon & Helmut Anheir 
eds., 1997)). Due to the duality of nonprofits, ―the ties are close, and sometimes nearly 
indistinguishable, between government and the nonprofit organization.‖ Id. 
 97. Pestoff, supra note 93, at 80. 
 98. Id. at 64–68. 
 99. Id. at 72. 
 100. Id. Some Swedes hold the viewpoint that charity is ―the poor being forced by circumstances 
to accept gifts from the rich.‖ Id. at 69. They prefer to focus instead upon self-help and entitlement 
programs, rather than ―charity‖ as a means of providing needed support. Id. This focus may be part of 
the reason why, unlike most other Western countries that grant some type of income tax relief to 
promote charitable giving, Sweden does not provide any charitable relief for charitable contributions. 
Ilan Benshalom, The Dual Subsidy Theory of Charitable Deductions, 84 IND. L.J. 1047, 1048 & n.2 
(citing LESTER M. SALAMON, THE INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO NONPROFIT LAW (1997)).  
 101. Pestoff, supra note 93, at 68. 
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and then the Crown.
102
 Throughout the nineteenth century, charitable 
societies and associations evolved but were primarily headed by the social 
elite.
103
 Following industrialization near the end of that century, voluntary 
associations became more democratic and a broader source of 
collaboration for individuals of all classes.
104
 Upon the formation of the 
Swedish welfare state in the middle of the twentieth century, however, 
―many services were turned into rights and made available to most 
citizens,‖ and the role for voluntary associations diminished.105 Within the 
past half-century, the voluntary sector appears to be again gaining force, 
filling in the niches left behind by the public sector and contributing to a 
―growing welfare mix.‖106 
B. The Third Sector in Asia 
South Asia, as a collection of several distinct developing countries 
currently evolving with respect to the role of the third sector, offers an 
intriguing opportunity for study. The tensions between the third sector and 
the state are perhaps more raw in this region, and the regulation of 
nonprofits more strategic. 
1. India 
India is a country of contrasts. Its position in the world economy is 
elevating, yet the needs of its poor are abundant. Much emphasis in India 
is on the market sector and the impact of globalization on Indian growth. 
There remains, however, substantial demand for social services that are 
unmet by either the state or the market—and a natural role for the third 
sector to fill.
107
 
 
 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. at 68–69. This period of elitist philanthropy lasted roughly from 1810 to 1870. Id. 
 104. Id. at 69. Many of these organizations were engaged in furthering the goals of social 
movements, such as temperance organizations and trade unions. Id. 
 105. Id. at 71. Most voluntary associations supported the assumption of these responsibilities by 
the government. Id. 
 106. Id. Unlike the availability of Italian nonprofit organizations to engage in commercial activity, 
the Swedish nonprofit organizations that engage in business activity may only do so as long as these 
activities are not commercial. See Kerlin, supra note 35, at 18. In addition, the organization will have 
to pay taxes on the business activities that have no relationship to the nonprofit activity.  
 107. On India‘s struggle to influence nonprofit sector regulation through judicial action, see 
generally Mark Sidel, States, Markets, and the Nonprofit Sector in South Asia: Judiciaries and the 
Struggle for Capital in Comparative Perspective, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1611 (2004). 
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The right to join and form associations is guaranteed by the 
Constitution of India.
108
 Indian nonprofit law requires that voluntary 
organizations register with the government; most registration requirements 
are at the state level.
109
 Charitable trusts are also subject to regulation 
through state public trusts acts.
110
 Voluntary organizations are granted 
exemption from income tax, and individual donors may receive income 
tax deductions for qualifying donations.
111
 Although at first glance the 
regulatory structure may seem similar to the American model, the role of 
government in controlling nonprofits is in fact significantly stronger. 
The primary source of the power of the Indian government over 
voluntary organizations is the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act of 
1976 (FCRA).
112
 Unlike American charities, most Indian nonprofits either 
receive or want to receive foreign funds.
113
 Intermediary foreign charities, 
such as Save the Children, Oxfam, and Charities Aid Foundation, collect 
donations from American, European, and other foreign donors and stand 
in a position to provide financial support to Indian nonprofits.
114
 If an 
Indian nonprofit wants to accept this source of funding—and many or 
most do—they must submit to the strictures of the FCRA. 
The FCRA requires that a nonprofit register with the central 
government‘s Ministry of Home Affairs in order to be eligible to receive 
foreign donations.
115
 Unregistered nonprofits may accept a foreign 
contribution on a one-time basis if they are granted ―prior permission‖ by 
the Ministry.
116
 The Ministry interprets the language of the FCRA and can 
bring enforcement actions in court.
117
 The Act requires not only 
 
 
 108. INDIA CONST. art. 19, cl. 1(c). This right to form associations was, however, temporarily 
limited in the 1970s when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi imposed an ―emergency rule‖ that ―suspended 
civil liberties, and banned and disbanded a range of nongovernmental organizations.‖ Sidel, supra note 
107, at 1619 (citing CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME 
COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 96 (1998)). 
 109. The Societies Registration Act, No. 21 of 1860, INDIA CODE (1860); see also Sidel, supra 
note 107, at 1619. 
 110. See id. 
 111. The Income Tax Act, No. 43 of 1961, amended by The Finance Act, No. 32 of 2003, INDIA 
CODE (2003); see also Sidel, supra note 107, at 1619. 
 112. See generally The Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, No. 49 of 1976, INDIA CODE 
(1976), available at http://www.accountaid.net.  
 113. See Sidel, supra note 107, at 1620–21. 
 114. See SAVE THE CHILDREN, http://www.savethechildren.in/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2011); OXFAM 
INDIA, http://www.oxfamindia.org/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2011); CAF INDIA, http://www.cafindia.org/ 
(last visited Jan. 21, 2011) (for information on Charities Aid Foundation—India). 
 115. See The Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, No. 49 of 1976, pmbl., INDIA CODE (1976). 
 116. Id. ch. 2, §§ 10–11. 
 117. See The Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Rules, 1976, Gazette of India, section III(2), ch. 
4, r. 6 (Aug. 5, 1976). 
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registration, but continued reporting and compliance, including the 
maintenance of only one bank account to hold foreign funds.
118
 
The Ministry‘s interpretation of the language of the statute and 
approval or denial of requests is highly discretionary and largely 
unfettered. Although a High Court decision found that the role of the 
Ministry should be purely ―administrative‖ and allow only minimal 
exercise of discretion, with registration routinely granted so long as 
applications were accurate,
119
 a compromise in the litigation spurring this 
case led to this decision being of no binding precedent.
120
 The Ministry has 
issued guidelines upon which FCRA registration may be denied, but these 
rules still leave ample room for discretion.
121
 
The registration requirements of the FCRA require nonprofits to submit 
to multiple levels of review and approval, with decision-makers at each 
phase of the process granted largely unlimited discretion. Before an FCRA 
application is submitted to the Ministry, the nonprofit must first obtain a 
―political no-objection‖ certificate from the regional district collector (a 
local official).
122
 The official is asked to certify that the ―antecedents of the 
organization have been verified and there is nothing adverse against 
them,‖ that it has done ―welfare activities‖ in the local area, and that the 
―project would be beneficial to the people living in the [local] area.‖123 
Discretionary language along these lines rests substantial power in the 
hands of local officials, who may be corruptible to varying degrees. 
 
 
 118. See Cent. Bureau of Investigation & Anr v. M. Kurian Chief Functionary of the Cross, 
Special Leave Petition (crl.) 84–86 of 2001 (India) (holding that a nonprofit violated the Act by 
maintaining multiple bank accounts). 
 119. Calcutta Rescue v. Union of India, Calcutta H.C., Mar. 20, 1996 (Supreme Court Litigation 
File 1-55). 
 120. Order of the Supreme Court of India, Union of India v. Calcutta Rescue, Nov. 8, 2001 
(Supreme Court Litigation File 250–51). 
 121. See Sidel, supra note 107, at 1650. Sidel found that: 
Listed grounds for denial included links to another prohibited organization, propagation of 
sedition or violence, creation of communal tension or disharmony, links to family 
organizations, conviction or current prosecution of principal officers, conversion activities, 
organization in the formative stage, . . . fictional organizations, the presence of foreign citizen 
officeholders or chief executives, and total annual organizational expenditures of less than 
75,000 rupees. The breadth of these procedures vitiates any specificity or real process that 
their release implies and leaves the Home Ministry free to deny registration or other benefits 
of the Act to virtually any organization it chooses.  
Id. at 1650 n.118. 
 122. Id. at 1642. 
 123. Id. at 1642 n.100 (citing VOLUNTARY ACTION NETWORK INDIA, A Note of the Background to 
the Drafting of Model Bill for Registration of Societies in India, Prepared for the National Meeting on 
Creating Conducive Legal Environment for the Voluntary Sector 3 (Mar. 16–17, 2000)). 
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As a practical matter, the most efficient and least expensive manner of 
obtaining favorable governmental treatment of nonprofits is through 
bribery.
124
 The ―expected relationships with regulatory authorities,‖ in 
which decision-makers are persuaded through bribes, can frustrate 
nonprofits intent on operating by the book.
125
 
2. Bangladesh 
Bangladesh is by all appearances a nation in transition—one that is 
exploring the options the nonprofit sector has to offer and is testing the 
boundaries of its role. Bangladeshi law recognizes the organization and 
operation of nonprofit societies. The Societies Registration Act of 1860 
provides for the registration of the following societies: 
Charitable societies[,] . . . societies established for the promotion of 
science, literature, or the fine arts, for instruction, the diffusion of 
useful knowledge[,] . . . the foundation or maintenance of libraries 
or reading rooms for general use among the members or open to the 
public, or public museum and galleries of painting and other works 
of art, collections of natural history, mechanical and philosophical 
inventions, instruments, or designs.
126
 
A recent struggle has occurred under Bangladeshi law related to the 
commercial activities of nonprofit organizations. A large and powerful 
nonprofit, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), was 
granted a license by the government to operate a bank.
127
 It was previously 
unclear whether nonprofit societies were authorized to engage in such 
commercial activities, and if so, the extent to which they would be 
taxed.
128
 The courts resolved the issue largely in favor of the nonprofit, 
authorizing its commercial banking activities despite lacking a direct 
connection to its charitable mission.
129
 The court seemed persuaded by the 
 
 
 124. The multiple-level license procurement process offers opportunities for the license providers 
to ―harass‖ applicants for the license. See Sidel, supra note 107, at 1625 n.30 (citing VOLUNTARY 
ACTION NETWORK INDIA, A Note of the Background to the Drafting of Model Bill for Registration of 
Societies in India, Prepared for the National Meeting on Creating Conducive Legal Environment for 
the Voluntary Sector 7 (Mar. 16–17, 2000)). 
 125. Sidel, supra note 107, at 1642. 
 126. The Societies Registration Act, No. 21 of 1860, § 20 INDIA CODE (2003). 
 127. For an extensive discussion of the BRAC bank controversy, see Sidel, supra note 107, at 
1651–68. 
 128. The Societies Registration Act did not list banking as a permissible activity of a nonprofit, so 
Professor Ahmed argued that the actions were outside the scope of a nonprofit society. See Sidel, 
supra note 107, at 1656. 
 129. The High Court Division held that the banking activities were not permitted by a nonprofit 
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nonprofit‘s desire to support itself, rather than to rely on contributions 
from (largely foreign) donors.
130
 
The tax issue was also of serious consequence. If a nonprofit can 
compete with a for-profit on commercial grounds, are the receipts tax-
exempt, giving the nonprofit a strong competitive advantage? Although 
the original answer seemed to be yes, the Finance Act of 1999 levied a tax 
on nonprofit commercial income.
131
 Voluntary associations must now pay 
a tax of 25% on receipts from commercial income, and may then dedicate 
the balance to their nonprofit work.
132
 Nonprofits remain exempt from 
federal taxes on income derived from their property, so long as the income 
is used entirely for religious or charitable purposes.
133
 Today, tax 
exemption has been expanded to include ―all philanthropic and 
educational institutions approved by the government.‖134 This expansion in 
the tax provision should increase the availability of resources to the 
nonprofit sector.
135
  
Social business and enterprise, which can entail the cooperation of the 
second and third sectors, is taking on a growing importance in 
Bangladeshi society. While the types of social business vary, some of the 
more prominent examples in Bangladesh include: 
[T]he Grameen businesses pioneered by Muhammad Yunus who 
won the Nobel Peace Prize for his microcredit bank Grameen Bank, 
which he founded along with Grameen Shakti of Grameen Energy, 
which has brought renewable energy to Bangladesh; Grameen 
Kalyan (Grameen Welfare) bringing affordable healthcare to the 
 
 
association. See Ahmed v. Bangladesh Bank, 20 BLD (HCD) 235 (Bangl. H.C. 2000). The Supreme 
Court, however, disagreed. BRAC v. Ahmed, 7 MLR (AD) 49, 54 (Bangl. 2002). 
 130. See id.  
 131. See id. (discussing the application of the new Finance Act of 1999 to BRAC). 
 132. Sidel, supra note 107, at 1658 (citing BRAC v. Ahmed, supra note 129, at 70.). 
 133. Sidel, supra note 107, at 1657 (citing Sumaiya Khair & Saira Rahman Khan, Philanthropy 
and Law in Bangladesh, in PHILANTHROPY AND LAW IN SOUTH ASIA (Mark Sidel & Iftekhar Zaman 
eds., 2004)). 
 134. Sanjay Agrival et al., Asia Pacific Philanthropy Consortium, Philanthropy and Law in South 
Asia—Recent Developments in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka 14 (Sept. 2007), 
available at http://www.istr.org/news/pdf/PALISA%20Update%20Workshop%20Report.pdf. Under 
the new approval process: 
NGOs shall submit a written application to the National Bureau of Revenue profiling their 
activities, and the Bureau shall decide whether the contributions in question qualify for a tax 
deduction. Needless to say, this process requires careful scrutiny and strict monitoring since it 
involves considerable discretion in delineating what constitutes an eligible philanthropic or 
educational institution.  
Id.  
 135. Id. at 15.  
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poor in Bangladesh, which has spawned a network of for-profit and 
nonprofit social businesses dedicated to transforming the health of 
the poor; and recently Grameen Danone, a social business 
partnership with Groupe Danone, the French yogurt conglomerate, 
which provides low cost highly nutritious food for the poor.
136
 
In today‘s economic downturn, ―the social business has proven to be an 
effective way for charities to sustain themselves and their missions in an 
era where government downsizing has deprived them of an important 
source of support.‖137 The growth of the nonprofit sector in Bangladesh 
can be attributed to the sector‘s increasing participation in advocacy and 
government and continued efforts in poverty reduction.
138
  
3. Pakistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka 
Although these three Southeast Asian countries are distinctive, this 
discussion will treat them briefly and together. Pakistan, Nepal, and Sri 
Lanka share certain challenges and opportunities.
139
 All face substantial 
state control over permissibility of investments.
140
 Each has a modest tax 
system dogged by multiple levels of bureaucracy and noncompliance.
141
 
And each exerts a significant amount of discretionary authority over its 
nonprofits through registration procedures.
142
 
Pakistan offers a wide variety of organizational forms for nonprofit 
organizations, which may be organized as trusts, societies, companies, 
endowments, cooperatives, voluntary social welfare agencies, or in other 
 
 
 136. Barbara K. Bucholtz, Doing Well by Doing Good and Vice Versa: Self-Sustaining 
NGO/Nonprofit Organizations, 17 J.L. & POL‘Y 403, 441 n.133 (2009).  
 137. Id. at 441. Another one of the success stories has been the introduction of the Silk 
Development Project. See Rie Makita, New NGO–Elite Relations in Business Development for the 
Poor in Rural Bangladesh, 20 VOLUNTAS 50, 55 (2009). Along with assistance from the Bangladeshi 
government and the World Bank, the Bangladesh Silk Foundation (a nonprofit organization) 
established this program to aid rural women in reviving the silk industry. Id. (stating that the 
―Bangladesh Silk Foundation does not support producers directly, but works through NGOs with 
established internal silk production programs‖). 
 138. Agrival et al., supra note 134, at 6. 
 139. See generally Mark Sidel & Iftekhar Zaman, Philanthropy and Law in South Asia: Key 
Themes and Key Choices, 7(2) INT‘L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 38 (2005) [hereinafter Key Themes and 
Key Choices]. This Article, in turn, draws heavily upon PHILANTHROPY AND LAW IN SOUTH ASIA 
(Mark Sidel & Iftekhar Zaman eds., 2004), particularly Anil Kumar Sinha & Sapana Pradham Malla, 
Philanthropy and Law in Nepal, at 214–28, Arittha Wikramanayake, Philanthropy and Law in Sri 
Lanka, at 325–56, and Zafar Hameed Ismail & Quadeer Baig, Philanthropy and Law in Pakistan, at 
288–322. 
 140. Key Themes and Key Choices, supra note 139, at 50–51. 
 141. Id. at 47–49. 
 142. Id. at 45–46. 
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forms.
143
 Nepal, likewise, offers substantial flexibility to nonprofits in 
organizational form. Nonprofits may organize as cooperatives, societies, 
statutory trusts, or formed trusts.
144
 Sri Lanka allows for creation of 
nonprofits through acts of Parliament, or organization as trusts, 
cooperatives, societies, or companies.
145
 Private companies are an 
increasingly popular choice for participating in the voluntary sector in Sri 
Lanka, because of the limited liability, management control, and 
confidentiality characteristics of the form.
146
  
The relative diversity and flexibility in selecting nonprofit 
organizational forms that Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Pakistan share leads these 
countries to a similar predicament. For each of these countries, each form 
of organization ―has its own vertical structure of government monitoring 
and regulation.‖147 Nonprofit organizations with similar aims and 
operations may face different regulators with varying degrees of oversight 
and control. Arittha Wikramanayake, who has studied nonprofits in Sri 
Lanka, has commented that a key drawback of the regulatory system is the 
―multiplicity of regulators, the overlapping of laws and regulations and 
lack of common standards . . . [and] the creation of considerable 
opportunities for ‗regulatory arbitrage‘ that even extend as far as non-
regulation,‖ in which nonprofits are ―permitted to operate under varying 
degrees of regulatory conformity.‖148 
All three countries offer some tax benefits to the nonprofit sector and 
its donors, but vary as to how consistently the system is applied.
149
 
Pakistan requires discretionary exemption procedures, where tax 
authorities at multiple levels of government (central, regional, and local) 
wield significant authority and control.
150
 Although Sri Lanka provides tax 
exemptions and deductions to support charitable giving and charitable 
organizations, these tax incentives play only a nominal role in nonprofit 
regulation.
151
 The low level of tax compliance—only 150,000 registered 
 
 
 143. Id. at 42. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Key Themes and Key Choices, supra note 139, at 50 (citing Wikramanayake, supra note 139, 
at 340). 
 147. Id. at 42. 
 148. Id. (citing Wikramanayake, supra note 139, at 347–48). 
 149. Id. at 47–49. 
 150. Id. (citing Ismail & Baig, supra note 139, at 286, 288). ―Speed money‖ is often expected by 
government administrators to streamline the informal process. Ismail & Baig, supra note 139, at 288. 
 151. Key Themes and Key Choices, supra note 139, at 49. 
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taxpayers in a country of over 18 million—necessarily makes tax 
incentives moot for the majority of the population.
152
 
In Nepal, nonprofits are exempt from a value-added tax and from taxes 
on cooperatives, but, although the exemption is statutory, nonprofits must 
apply for the right to the exemption.
153
 These application and registration 
procedures to obtain exemption rest continued control and discretion in the 
Nepalese government.
154
 The tax law is vague enough as to the exemption 
requirements to allow substantial decision-making authority by the state, 
and permits delay, corruption, and inequality in treatment.
155
 In limited 
circumstances, donors to charitable organizations in Nepal may be entitled 
to tax deductions.
156
  
All three countries require registration with the government for new 
nonprofits.
157
 Nepal offers centralized statutory procedures for nonprofit 
registration, but the system retains a good deal of discretion in the hands 
of the bureaucratic administration.
158
 The formalities and requirements for 
organization often have no particular time frame and little specificity, 
which can lead to delay or abuse of power.
159
 The Nepalese government 
retains control over its nonprofits through its right to terminate them; if a 
nonprofit is voluntarily or involuntarily dissolved, its assets (after payment 
of obligations) pass to the state.
160
 
The Sri Lankan government retains significant ongoing control over its 
nonprofits through its broad authority to terminate, take over, or dissolve 
nonprofits on a wide variety of grounds that allow ample government 
discretion.
161
 There is some deterrence to abuse of this discretion, as 
nonprofits may challenge government action in court, but the government 
retains significant power over nonprofits through this mechanism.
162
 
Pakistan wields similar control to exercise management takeover rights, 
 
 
 152. Id. (citing Wikramanayake, supra note 139, at 357, 363–64). The level of tax evasion in Sri 
Lanka calls into question ―whether the tax law itself would be sufficient to make any real impact on 
public participation in philanthropic and nonprofit activity,‖ and ―makes the whole system of taxes a 
subject of ridicule.‖ Wikramanayake, supra note 139, at 364. 
 153. Key Themes and Key Choices, supra note 139, at 47–48 (citing Sinha & Malla, supra note 
139, at 226–28). 
 154. Id. at 48. 
 155. Id. (citing Sinha & Malla, supra note 139, at 226–28). 
 156. Id. at 48. 
 157. Id. at 42. 
 158. Id. at 44 (citing Sinha & Malla, supra note 139, at 210). 
 159. Key Themes and Key Choices, supra note 139, at 44. 
 160. Id. at 47 (citing Sinha & Malla, supra note 139, at 214). 
 161. Id. at 46 (citing Wikramanayake, supra note 139, at 351). 
 162. Id. 
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and a more serious issue of arbitrary and effectively unreviewable 
government action.
163
 
Nonprofits throughout Asia and Europe, though clearly unique in the 
administrative details, share certain key similarities in their regulatory 
goals. The above discussion highlights how each country struggles with 
the balance of power between first sector and third sector—between state 
and nonprofit. This is a primary focus of nonprofit regulation in each 
country discussed, although the means to the ends vary greatly. We turn 
now to a discussion of American nonprofit law, which, as we shall see, 
diverges from this shared regulatory priority. 
III. AMERICAN NONPROFIT LAW 
The third sector is a substantial part of the U.S. economy. In 2006, 
charitable nonprofits, excluding private foundations, reported $1.4 trillion 
in revenue and $2.5 trillion in assets.
164
 The majority of revenue ($920.6 
billion) was derived from program services (fees received for charitable 
programs).
165
 Private foundations are also on the rise, with Form 990-PF
166
 
filers increasing 3% between 2004 and 2006.
167
 
The U.S. third sector has a dualist approach to governance, with 
regulation at both the state and national levels.
168
 This approach 
―bifurcates responsibility for regulating‖ nonprofits between state 
government and federal government.
169
 This Article will first introduce the 
basics of state nonprofit law, and then discuss the federal regulatory 
scheme. 
 
 
 163. Id. at 47 (citing Ismail & Baig, supra note 139, at 322). 
 164. IRS Statistics of Income Bulletin, 29 SOI Bulletin 2 (May 2007), available at http://www.irs. 
gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=215634,00.html; see also Estate Planning Newsletter 1550, LEIMBERG INFO. 
SERVS., INC., Nov. 24, 2009, available at http://www.leimbergservices.com. 
 165. See IRS Statistics of Income Bulletin, supra note 164. 
 166. The Form 990-PF is the annual informational return that private foundations must submit to 
the IRS; it is available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990pf.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2011). 
 167. See IRS Statistics of Income Bulletin, supra note 164. 
 168. See Brian D. Galle, Foundation or Empire? The Role of Charity in a Federal System (FSU 
College of Law; Public Law Research Paper No. 394, Law, Business & Economics Paper No. 09-25, 
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1473107. 
 169. Gary Jenkins, State-Level Legal Reform of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations: 
Incorporation Choice, Uniformity, and the Reform of Nonprofit State Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1113, 1125 
(2007). 
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A. State Regulation 
The state regulation of nonprofit organizations is structured to support 
the role of charities in society while providing some protections against 
abuse. The effectiveness of regulation varies widely among the states, as 
do the resources allocated to enforcement. Broadly, state law governs how 
charitable organizations may be created, the form they may take, the 
fiduciary duties of their leaders, and regulation of their continued 
operation. 
A charity in America is generally organized as either a trust or a 
corporation,
170
 with the corporation as the most common form.
171
 
Regardless of the organizational form, the purposes must be charitable.
172
 
State law often frames the notion of what constitutes a charitable purpose 
with reference to the Statute of Charitable Uses of 1601.
173
 The current 
Restatement of Trusts rule is similar: ―charitable purposes‖ includes ―(a) 
the relief of poverty; (b) the advancement of knowledge or education; (c) 
the advancement of religion; (d) the promotion of health; (e) governmental 
or municipal purposes; and (f) other purposes that are beneficial to the 
community.‖174 
Statutes setting forth requirements of nonprofit purposes of 
corporations are generally consistent, although there is variation as to the 
degree of detail. Many statutes take an approach similar to that of the 
Restatement and the Statute of Charitable Uses, listing certain purposes 
 
 
 170. Limited liability companies are treated as corporations and may also serve as the form of a 
charitable organization. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION 
TEXT 111 (2000). 
 171. See Moody, supra note 3, at 1354. 
 172. See Matter of Rockefeller‘s Estate, 165 N.Y.S. 154, 157 (App. Div. 1917), aff’d, 119 N.E. 
1074 (N.Y. 1918) (stating that ―the test of a charitable gift or use and a charitable corporation are the 
same‖).  
 173. Charitable Uses Act, 1601, 43 Eliz. I, c. 4 (Eng.). The preamble to the statute lists as 
charitable purposes:  
Releife of aged impotent and poore people, some for Maintenance of sicke and maymed 
Souldiers and Marriners, Schooles of Learninge, Free Schooles and Schollers in Universities, 
some for Repaire of Bridges Portes Havens Causwaies Churches Seabankes and Highwaies, 
some for Educacion and prefermente of Orphans, some for or towardes Reliefe Stocke or 
Maintenance of Howses of Correccion, some for Mariages of poore Maides, some for 
Supportacion Ayde and Helpe of younge tradesmen Handicraftesmen and persons decayed, 
and others for reliefe or redemption of Prisoners or Captives, and for aide or ease of any 
poore Inhabitantes concerninge paymente of Fifteenes, setting out of Souldiers and other 
Taxes . . . . 
Id. 
 174. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 (2003). 
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that are traditionally considered charitable.
175
 Others make reference to the 
definition contained in the Internal Revenue Code.
176
 The Revised Model 
Nonprofit Corporation Act (―RMNCA‖), however, takes a broader 
approach in its definitions, such that corporations are broadly categorized 
as religious, public benefit, or mutual benefit organizations.
177
 Reference 
is then made to state law as to what constitutes a ―charitable‖ 
disposition.
178
 
Charitable corporations require authorization from the state in order to 
be created.
179
 Incorporation of nonprofit corporations is similar to the 
process for for-profit ones, with instruments being filed with the Secretary 
of State or other state official.
180
 The application often requires only 
minimal information including the organization‘s purposes and powers, as 
well as contact information for the directors and members.
181
 Upon filing 
the proper paperwork and fees, the incorporator will receive a charter or 
certificate of incorporation issued by the state official.
182
 
Although charities may be structured in either the trust form or the 
corporate one, the fiduciary duties of their trustees or officers are 
similar.
183
 American trust law is relatively consistent across the states with 
respect to fiduciary duties, due in part to the ―statutorification‖ of trust law 
around the turn of the millennium.
184
 The two key fiduciary norms are the 
duties of prudence and loyalty.
185
 The duty of loyalty requires trustees to 
 
 
 175. See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 105/103.05 (2006). 
 176. See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 105/103.05(a)(31) (1986) (authorizing as a valid charitable 
purpose of a nonprofit corporation ―any purpose permitted to be exempt from taxation under Sections 
501(c) or 501(d) of the United States Internal Revenue Code . . .‖). 
 177. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION ACT § 3.01(a) (1987). 
 178. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION ACT § 2.02(2) (1987). 
 179. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-122-101 (2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-B § 404 
(2004); see also MARION FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND 
STATE LAW AND REGULATION 152 (2004). 
 180. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 179, at 152. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. See Evelyn Brody, Charity Governance: What’s Trust Law Got to Do with It?, 80 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 641, 686 (2005) (―The fiduciary standards for trustees of charitable trusts and for directors of 
corporate charities are more similar than commonly believed.‖). For more on fiduciary duties and their 
limits, see generally Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default 
Rules, 94 GEO. L.J. 67 (2005). 
 184. John H. Langbein, Why Did Trust Law Become Statute Law in the United States?, 58 ALA. L. 
REV. 1069, 1078 (2007). 
 185. Id. at 1077. In addition to adhering to the duties of loyalty and prudence, trustees of 
charitable trusts must also respect several administrative duties. The Restatement sets forth these 
administrative duties as follows: 
(1) The trustee has a duty to administer the trust, diligently and in good faith, in accordance 
with the terms of the trust and applicable law. 
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administer trust property only in the interest of the beneficiaries, or in the 
case of a charitable trust, only in furtherance of its charitable purposes.
186
 
The duty of prudence requires that a trustee ―administer the trust as a 
prudent person would, by considering the purposes, terms, distribution 
requirements, and other circumstances of the trust. In satisfying this 
standard, the trustee shall exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution.‖187 
The RMNCA is similar in its emphasis on prudence and loyalty, and 
requires that nonprofit directors discharge their duties ―(1) in good faith; 
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would 
exercise under similar circumstances; and (3) in a manner the director 
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.‖188 The 
RMNCA is consistent with well-established norms of fiduciary 
behavior,
189
 but is more closely aligned with corporate law than trust 
law.
190
 
The duties owed by charitable leaders are enforced by state courts, as 
described in the following section. The sources of regulation at the state 
level are concentrated largely in the courts and the Attorney General‘s 
office. Unlike private trusts, a charity organized as a trust does not have 
beneficiaries; therefore, enforcement of charitable trusts differs from 
private trusts.
191
 Because of the lack of ascertainable beneficiaries, a ―suit 
can be maintained for the enforcement of a charitable trust by the Attorney 
General or other public officer, or by a co-trustee, or by a person who has 
 
 
(2) In administering the trust, the trustee's responsibilities include performance of the 
following functions:  
(a) ascertaining the duties and powers of the trusteeship, and the beneficiaries and purposes of 
the trust; 
(b) collecting and protecting trust property; 
(c) managing the trust estate to provide returns or other benefits from trust property; and 
(d) applying or distributing trust income and principal during the administration of the trust 
and upon its termination.  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 76 (2003). The trustees must also provide accountings to the 
beneficiaries. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 82 (2003).  
 186. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (2003); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TRUSTS § 78 (Duty of Loyalty) (Council Draft No. 4, Nov. 10, 2004). 
 187. UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 804 (2000); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 77 
(2003). 
 188. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT 830(a) (1987). 
 189. See Moody, supra note 3, at 1337. Some commentators do stress, however, the differences 
between trust law and corporate law. See id. 
 190. The drafters of the RMNCA deliberately rejected trust law language in favor of a standard 
consistent with general corporate law. Susan N. Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust 
Law, Corporate Law, and Tax Law, 21 HAWAII L. REV. 593, 611 (1999). 
 191. See id. at 618 (1999) (discussing the differences between charitable and private trusts); see 
also JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 750 (7th ed. 2005). 
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a special interest in the enforcement of the charitable trust.‖192 Despite the 
similarity in structure among the states as to how charities are regulated, 
the effectiveness of the regulation varies widely, depending upon how 
each state‘s Attorney General carries out these enforcement duties.193 
State judicial power over corporate nonprofits is similar. Even when 
the corporate form is selected, there is an ―existence of a trust for 
indefinite beneficiaries implicit in every charitable gift.‖194 Additionally, 
the state retains the power of visitation over all corporations, originating 
from its power to create them.
195
 State statutes enhance this power by 
granting courts the power to dissolve corporations that take actions to 
injure the public or which exceed their powers.
196
 
Regulation through the courts gives the state some authority over 
operating nonprofit organizations. State court decisions effectively shape 
the limits of trustee powers and duties, proper investments, and the 
definition of charitable purpose.
197
 In cases of severe abuse, a court may 
replace trustees or directors or dissolve a nonprofit entirely.
198
 Whether a 
state exercises such powers over nonprofits, however, varies depending 
upon the resources allocated to enforcement.
199
 The existence of the 
authority, therefore, does not mean that such authority is regularly 
exercised. 
States regulate the relationship between their nonprofits and their 
citizens by requiring advance registration for solicitation of charitable 
funds.
200
 Many states have coordinated their approaches to registration for 
solicitation; several states will accept a uniform application.
201
 
States also regulate their nonprofits in the same manner that the federal 
government does—through tax benefits. States often grant exemptions 
 
 
 192. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (1959).  
 193. See Jenkins, supra note 169, at 1128 (noting that most states allocate very little resources to 
charitable enforcement, with 74% of states having no more than one full-time attorney working on 
oversight of nonprofits); see also FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 179, at 301. 
 194. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 179, at 303. 
 195. Id. 
 196. See MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT 14.30(2) (1995). 
 197. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 179, at 302. 
 198. Id. 
 199. For a discussion of the variety of state enforcement regimes including California, New York, 
Ohio, Massachusetts, Illinois, and Texas, see id., at 351–61. 
 200. See generally Richard Steinberg, Economic Perspectives on Regulation of Charitable 
Solicitation, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 775 (1989). 
 201. The website for the National Association of State Charitable Officials provides a link to a 
unified registration statement for charitable solicitations. See NAT‘L ASS‘N OF STATE CHARITABLE 
OFFICIALS, http://www.nasconet.org/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2011). 
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from income tax, property tax, and/or estate and inheritance taxes.
202
 Many 
states grant exemption from property taxes for entities that meet the state 
requirements of charitable organizations, at least for property used for the 
charitable purpose.
203
 
Certain nonprofit organizations, such as universities and hospitals, will 
have additional layers of state regulation. Universities, colleges, and 
schools, for instance, are often regulated by a state board of education; 
hospitals and health care agencies are overseen by state departments of 
health.
204
 These agencies are generally restricted as to the scope of their 
oversight.
205
 
B. Federal Regulation 
Federal philanthropy law in the United States is unapologetically tax-
centric. Nonprofit law is commonly referred to as tax-exempt 
organizations law because of the regulatory force the Internal Revenue 
Code wields over nonprofits. The nonprofit committee of the American 
Bar Association is the Tax-Exempt Organizations Committee; it is a sub-
committee of the Taxation Committee of the ABA. Many lawyers who 
practice in the area of nonprofits do so through the tax departments of 
large firms; practice groups are often referred to as Exempt Organizations 
groups. 
Tax law substantially regulates and restricts the actions of nonprofits. 
The Internal Revenue Code lists the permissible purposes for nonprofit 
organizations,
206
 limits the private benefits of transactions in which 
nonprofits engage,
207
 and restricts the activities and investments of various 
types of nonprofit organizations.
208
 Failure to comply with tax provisions 
results in tax penalties or, worse, loss of recognition of tax-exempt status 
by the Internal Revenue Service. 
Tax plays a key regulatory function not only in the operation of 
nonprofits, but also in their funding. Individuals receive a charitable 
deduction from federal income tax (and state income tax in some 
jurisdictions) for grants to qualifying nonprofit organizations.
209
 
 
 
 202. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 179, at 130. 
 203. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5709.12. 
 204. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 179, at 301. 
 205. Id. 
 206. See I.R.C. § 501 (2010). 
 207. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010). 
 208. I.R.C. §§ 4941–4945 (2010). 
 209. See I.R.C. § 170(b) (2010). 
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Individuals also receive an unlimited deduction from federal estate and gift 
taxes for qualifying charitable contributions.
210
 Corporations, likewise, 
have tax incentives to encourage charitable giving.
211
 
An organization seeking the benefits of tax-exempt status must meet 
the Internal Revenue Code description of the types of organizations that 
qualify. Charitable organizations are described in section 501(c)(3), which 
exempts from tax: 
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, 
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, 
scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, 
or to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but 
only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic 
facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children 
or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit 
of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the 
activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise 
attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in 
subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in 
(including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political 
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public 
office.
212
 
The regulations provide that a valid charitable purpose includes ―relief of 
the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged; advancement of religion; 
advancement of education or science; erection or maintenance of public 
buildings, monuments, or works; lessening of the burdens of Government; 
and promotion of social welfare by organizations designed to accomplish 
any of the above purposes.‖ 213 It may also include purposes to ―lessen 
neighborhood tensions,‖ ―to eliminate prejudice and discrimination,‖ ―to 
defend human and civil rights secured by law,‖ and ―to combat 
community deterioration and juvenile delinquency.‖214 
Several other types of organizations,
215
 which are not charitable but are 
still broadly considered part of the voluntary sector, also are granted 
 
 
 210. See I.R.C. §§ 2522, 2055 (2010). 
 211. See I.R.C. § 170(d)(2) (2010). 
 212. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010). Certain types of charities are described under other sections of the 
code, such as religious associations (I.R.C. § 501(d)) and cooperative hospital or educational 
organizations (I.R.C. § 501(e) and (f)). 
 213. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2)(1960). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Treasury Regulations section 501(c) alone describes twenty-eight different types of 
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freedom from taxation, at least for most activities.
216
 Social welfare 
organizations are tax-exempt,
217
 as are political organizations,
218
 social 
clubs,
219
 and farm cooperatives.
220
 Even charitable organizations described 
in section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, however, remain taxable 
on income for business activities unrelated to their exempt purpose.
221
 
To be exempt from income taxation, a nonprofit must pass both the 
organizational and the operational requirements of the Internal Revenue 
Code. The organizational test requires that the governing documents of the 
organization limit its purposes to exempt ones (as described in the Code) 
and do not expressly empower the organization to undertake substantial 
activities other than ones in furtherance of those exempt purposes.
222
 The 
 
 
organizations that are exempt from tax, with 501(c)(3) charities the most widely known. The IRS 
summarizes the types of nonprofits that are granted tax benefits in Publication 557 and provides the 
following list: 
501(c)(1): Corporations Organized Under Act of Congress (including Federal Credit Unions); 
501(c)(2): Title Holding Corporation for Exempt Organization; 501(c)(3): Religious, 
Educational, Charitable, Scientific, Literary, Testing for Public Safety, to Foster National or 
International Amateur Sports Competition, or Prevention of Cruelty to Children or Animals 
Organizations; 501(c)(4): Civic Leagues, Social Welfare Organizations, and Local 
Associations of Employees; 501(c)(5): Labor, Agricultural, and Horticultural Organizations; 
501(c)(6): Business Leagues, Chambers of Commerce, Real Estate Boards, etc.; 501(c)(7): 
Social and Recreational Clubs; 501(c)(8): Fraternal Beneficiary Societies and Associations; 
501(c)(9): Voluntary Employees Beneficiary Associations; 501(c)(10): Domestic Fraternal 
Societies and Associations; 501(c)(11): Teachers‘ Retirement Fund Associations; 501(c)(12): 
Benevolent Life Insurance Associations, Mutual Ditch or Irrigation Companies, Mutual or 
Cooperative Telephone Companies, etc.; 501(c)(13): Cemetery Companies; 501(c)(14): State-
Chartered Credit Unions, Mutual Reserve Funds; 501(c)(15): Mutual Insurance Companies or 
Associations; 501(c)(16): Cooperative Organizations to Finance Crop Operations; 501(c)(17): 
Supplemental Unemployment Benefit Trusts; 501(c)(18): Employee Funded Pension Trust 
(created before June 25, 1959); 501(c)(19): Post or Organization of Past or Present Members 
of the Armed Forces; 501(c)(21): Black Lung Benefit Trusts; 501(c)(22): Withdrawal 
Liability Payment Fund; 501(c)(23): Veterans Organization (created before 1880); 
501(c)(25): Title Holding Corporations or Trusts with Multiple Parents; 501(c)(26): State-
Sponsored Organization Providing Health Coverage for High-Risk Individuals; 501(c)(27): 
State-Sponsored Workers‘ Compensation Reinsurance Organization; 501(c)(28): National 
Railroad Retirement Investment Trust. 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 557, TAX-EXEMPT STATUS FOR YOUR ORGANIZATION, at 
65–66 (rev. Oct. 2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p557.pdf. 
 216.  Charities described in section 501(c)(3) are broadly granted exemption from taxation on 
income (with limited exceptions), but many other types of nonprofits remain subject to tax on 
investment and other categories of income. See I.R.C. §§ 512(a)(3)(A), 527(b), 1381 (2010).  
 217. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2010). 
 218. I.R.C. § 527 (2010). 
 219. I.R.C. § 501(c)(7) (2010).  
 220. I.R.C. § 521 (2010). 
 221. I.R.C. § 511 (2010). 
 222. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(i) (1960). 
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exempt purposes may be narrower than those described in the Code but 
cannot be broader.
223
 
The organizational test also entails certain restrictions on political 
activities and requirements for the use of its assets upon dissolution. The 
governing documents must not allow the charitable organization ―to 
devote more than an insubstantial part of its activities to attempting to 
influence legislation by propaganda or otherwise,‖224 or to participate or 
intervene in any political campaign.
225
 Upon dissolution of the 
organization, its assets must be used for an exempt purpose or distributed 
for a public purpose, and must not be distributed to the organization‘s 
members or shareholders.
226
 
The operational test requires that the organization engage ―primarily in 
activities which accomplish‖ section 501(c)(3) exempt purposes.227 The 
language ―primarily‖ is more lenient than the Internal Revenue Code 
language requiring ―exclusive‖ operation for exempt purposes.228 An 
organization will fail the operational test ―if its net earnings inure in whole 
or in part to the benefit of private shareholders or individuals.‖229 
―Private inurement‖230 has long been prohibited of charitable 
organizations.
231
 Private inurement entails benefits conveyed on insiders of 
the organization that are not proportional to the services the insider 
provided.
232
 It can exist in many contexts, including below-market sales
233
 
 
 
 223. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(ii) (1960). Even if the practice and intention of the 
organization is to conduct exclusively exempt activities, if the governing documents permit broader 
activities, exemption will be denied. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(iv). Only an insubstantial part 
of the organization‘s activities may be other than pursuing its exempt purposes. Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(iii) (1960). 
 224. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(3)(i) (1960). 
 225. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(3)(ii) (1960). Both direct and indirect participation are 
forbidden, as well as the publication of statements, and campaigning entails both that on behalf of and 
that in opposition to anyone‘s election. Id. Charities are also forbidden from engaging in activities of 
an action organization. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(3)(iii) (1960). 
 226. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(4) (1960). 
 227. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (1960). 
 228. Strict compliance with the standard of ―exclusively‖ would not be practicable. See FREMONT-
SMITH, supra note 179, at 247. 
 229. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (1960). The operational test also entails prohibitions on 
functioning as an ―action organization,‖ an entity that influences legislation. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-
1(c)(3) (1960). 
 230. Recall that one requirement of a 501(c)(3) organization is that ―no part of the net earnings of 
[the organization] inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.‖ I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) 
(2010).  
 231. For going on a century, there have been restrictions on private inurement. See Corporation 
Tax Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, § 113 (1909). 
 232. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 179, at 248–49. 
 233. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 82-34-084 (May 27, 1982). 
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or loans
234
 and excessive compensation.
235
 The prohibition of private 
inurement is ―not an absolute ban on self-dealing; rather it is a standard 
based on reasonableness that can be substantiated by reference to the terms 
of an arm‘s-length transaction.‖236 
Tax-exempt organizations are also restricted in the degree of private 
benefit they may provide. The Treasury Regulations explain that a 
nonprofit will not meet the organizational and operational tests described 
earlier in this section ―unless it serves a public rather than a private 
interest.‖237 A qualifying organization must demonstrate ―that it is not 
organized or operated for the benefit of private interests such as designated 
individuals, the creator or his family, shareholders of the organization, or 
persons controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private interests.‖238 
The Internal Revenue Code defines several classes of charitable 
organizations and treats them differently.
239
 There are four main categories 
of public charities, and all charitable organizations which fail classification 
as one of these public charities are classified as private foundations.
240
 
The first type of public charity is a publicly supported organization.
241
 
This group includes some institutions that are granted this status due to 
their category,
242
 including churches,
243
 educational organizations,
244
 
hospitals,
245
 state university endowment funds,
246
 and units of the 
government.
247
 It also includes charities that meet the support test: at least 
one-third of their annual support generally comes from governmental units 
or the general public.
248
 
The second type of public charity is a services organization, which 
receives substantial funding from a combination of donations and fees for 
 
 
 234. See Lowry Hosp. Ass‘n v. Comm‘r, 66 T.C. 850 (1976). 
 235. See Inc. Trs. of the Gospel Worker Soc‘y v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 374 (D.D.C. 1981), 
aff’d, 672 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944 (1982); Founding Church of 
Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1009 (1970). 
 236. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 179, at 248. 
 237. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (1960).  
 238. Id. 
 239. See I.R.C. §§ 4941–4945 (2010), which applies only to private foundations. 
 240. I.R.C. § 509 (2010). 
 241. I.R.C. § 509(a)(1) (2010).  
 242. Id.; see also I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) (2010). 
 243. See I.R.C. §§ 509(a)(1), 170(b)(1)(A)(i) (2010). 
 244. See I.R.C. §§ 509(a)(1), 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2010). 
 245. See I.R.C. §§ 509(a)(1), 170(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2010). 
 246. See id. 
 247. See I.R.C. §§ 509(a)(1), 170(b)(1)(A)(v) (2010. 
 248. See I.R.C. §§ 509(a)(1), 170(b)(1)(A)(iv) (2010); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e) (1969) 
(detailing how support is defined and placing limitations on how support may be derived). 
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exempt services or functions.
249
 Charities in this category must receive at 
least one-third of their public support from their exempt functions (such as 
through ticket sales or admission costs) combined with donations from 
governmental units and the general public.
250
 They may also receive less 
than one-third of their support from investment income.
251
 
Supporting organizations are the third type of public charity.
252
 These 
organizations derive their exempt status from their relationship with other 
public charities.
253
 The final type of public charity is a public safety 
charity—an organization whose exclusive function is to test for public 
safety.
254
 All organizations that do not qualify as one of the above four 
categories of public charities are private foundations. 
Private foundations are the most heavily regulated type of charitable 
organization under the Internal Revenue Code. They cannot engage in 
transactions with ―disqualified persons‖ (those closely associated with the 
foundation, including substantial donors, family members, or affiliated 
companies).
255
 They are required to limit their holdings of any one 
security, which cannot exceed a certain portion of their investment 
portfolio.
256
 They are restricted from making ―jeopardizing‖ 
investments—holdings with an unreasonable amount of risk.257 Finally, 
private foundations must meet minimum distribution requirements.
258
 
 
 
 249. See I.R.C. § 509(a)(2) (2010). 
 250. See id.; see Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-3(a) (1972) for limitations on the exempt function income 
any one person or entity may provide. 
 251. See I.R.C. § 509(a)(2) (2010).  
 252. See I.R.C. § 509(a)(3) (2010). For a thorough explanation of the details of the tax rules 
governing supporting organizations, see generally Alyssa A. DiRusso, Supporting the Supporting 
Organization: The Potential and Exploitation of 509(a)(3) Charities, 39 IND. L. REV. 207 (2006). 
 253. See I.R.C. § 509(a)(3) (2010), which provides that an organization is not a private foundation 
and is therefore classified as a supporting organization if it:  
(A) is organized, and at all times thereafter is operated, exclusively for the benefit of, to 
perform the functions of, or to carry out the purposes of one or more specified organizations 
described in paragraph (1) or (2), (B) is (i) operated, supervised, or controlled by or in 
connection with one or more organizations described in paragraph (1) or (2) . . ., and (C) is 
not controlled directly or indirectly by one or more disqualified persons . . . other than 
foundation managers and other than one or more organizations described in paragraph (1) or 
(2). 
 254. I.R.C. § 509(a)(4) (2010). Public safety organizations are rare; an example is the American 
Fireworks Standards Laboratory, a nonprofit organization formed to ―develop and maintain voluntary 
safety and quality standards‖ for fireworks and ―provide a testing program‖ for whether those 
standards are met. See AM. FIREWORKS STANDARDS LABORATORY, http://www.afsl.org (last visited 
Jan. 21, 2011). 
 255. See I.R.C. § 4941 (2010). 
 256. See I.R.C. § 4943 (2010). 
 257. See I.R.C. § 4944 (2010). 
 258. See I.R.C. § 4942 (2010). 
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These rules limit the way private foundations can structure their business 
agreements and invest their assets. 
Not only is the Internal Revenue Code the heart of American nonprofit 
regulation, the IRS itself has in recent years served as a substantial force of 
regulatory power. Federal tax penalties can be imposed on the 
organization (and in some cases the directors or trustees) in the event of 
breach of fiduciary duties.
259
 As explained earlier, charitable organizations 
are subject to a prohibition against private inurement.
260
 
In addition, the IRS can now impose supplementary taxes when a 
charitable organization engages in transactions that garner ―excess 
benefits‖ for its leaders or other insiders.261 Excess benefits exist when a 
tax-exempt organization provides an economic benefit to an insider ―if the 
value of the economic benefit provided exceeds the value of the 
consideration (including the performance of services) received for 
providing such benefit.‖262 Consequently, this section penalizes the insider 
and the nonprofit leaders who knowingly participated in the transaction, 
rather than the nonprofit itself.
263
 
Furthermore, upon a particularly egregious breach of fiduciary duties, 
the IRS can revoke an organization‘s tax-exempt status. Even the threat of 
revocation can often allow the IRS to influence the organization to change 
behaviors. However, because revoking a charity‘s tax-exempt status ―is 
such a drastic measure . . . the IRS uses it infrequently.‖264 Despite its 
infrequent use, complete revocation of tax-exempt status is an option, and 
has been used in severe cases of charitable abuse.
265
  
 
 
 259. See I.R.C. §§ 170(c), 501(c) (2010). 
 260. I.R.C. §§ 170(c), 501(c)(3) (2010). Because of this requirement, ―if a director, trustee or 
other person takes advantage of the charitable organization by taking excessive salary or by engaging 
in a self-dealing transaction that benefits the individual and harms the organization, the organization 
will fail to meet the requirements of sections 501(c)(3) and 170(c).‖ Gary, supra note 190, at 629–30. 
 261. See I.R.C. § 4958(a), (b). These insiders include ―any person who was, at any time during the 
5-year period ending on the date of such transaction, in a position to exercise substantial influence over 
the affairs of the organization‖ or a member of that person‘s family. I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1)(A)–(B) 
(2010).  
 262. I.R.C. § 4958(c)(1)(A) (2010).  
 263. Gary, supra note 190, at 630. The IRS imposes a tax of 25% on the excess benefit on the 
insider for the first offense. I.R.C. § 4958(a) (2010). A second-tier tax of 200% is levied on the insider 
if it is a repeat transaction. I.R.C. § 4958(b) (2010).  
 264. Gary, supra note 190, at 630. Part of the reason why revocation is so infrequently used is that 
[i]f an individual director has benefited at the expense of the nonprofit organization, revoking 
the organization's exempt status may be disproportionate to the offense committed. Rather 
than penalizing the director who benefited privately, revocation of exempt status penalizes the 
organization and the public interests served by the organization.  
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 265.  The Bishop Estate provides a key example of the role of the IRS in enforcing charities law. 
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The Internal Revenue Code serves not just as regulation for the 
activities of nonprofits themselves, but as key motivator for donations to 
them. American tax law provides several incentives for individuals, as 
well as corporations, to engage in charitable giving. In allowing a 
reduction in tax liability for charitable contributions, Congress encourages 
individuals and organizations to personally support a wide range of 
activities that the government does not directly assist.
266
 The most 
common tax incentives are provided through a deduction in the taxpayer‘s 
liability for federal income taxes (including incentives for corporations) 
and federal transfer taxes.  
The general rule is that individuals are allowed a deduction on their 
federal income tax return for any charitable contributions made during the 
taxable year.
267
 There are limitations, however, not only on which 
charitable contributions will qualify for a deduction, but also on the value 
of allowable deductions in any given year.
268
 In order for the taxpayer to 
take advantage of these incentives, several requirements must be met.  
First, the charitable contribution must be made to a qualifying 
recipient.
269
 Second, the value of the charitable contributions must not 
 
 
For an extensive discussion of the Bishop Estate scandal, see SAMUEL P. KING & RANDALL W. ROTH, 
BROKEN TRUST: GREED, MISMANAGEMENT, AND POLITICAL MANIPULATION AT AMERICA'S LARGEST 
CHARITABLE TRUST (2006). See also DUKEMINIER, supra note 191, at 763. In the Bishop Estate case, 
the IRS revoked the trust's tax-exempt status retroactively, but stated that it would restore the status if 
the five trustees resigned or were removed. Id. at 765. The IRS found ―that the Estate was not being 
operated primarily for charitable purposes; that it had gotten directly involved in local and national 
political campaigns; trustee fees were grossly in excess of the value of the trustees‘ services; and there 
has been numerous instances of private benefit of trust assets.‖ Id.; see also Gary, supra note 190, at 
630 (―That threat resulted in the temporary removal of the trustees and likely influenced the decision 
to remove the trustees permanently.‖ (footnote omitted)).  
 266. See, e.g., Brinley v. Comm‘r, 782 F.2d 1326, 1336 (5th Cir. 1986) (Hill, J., dissenting) 
(―[T]he practice of making charitable contributions is a most worthy attribute of our society and should 
be encouraged since it aids in the accomplishment of many social goals which our federal and local 
governments otherwise cannot or will not accomplish . . . .‖).  
 267. See I.R.C. § 170(a) (2010).  
 268. The Internal Revenue Code also regulates valuation of charitable deductions, and may 
impose tax penalties in the event a taxpayer inflates the value of a donation. See generally I.R.C. 
§ 6662 (2010).  
 269. See I.R.C. § 170(c) (2010). Section 170(c) defines a charitable contribution to include a State, 
or any political subdivision of a State, ―if the contribution or gift is made for exclusively public 
purposes.‖ I.R.C. § 170(c)(1) (2010). A contribution to a corporation, trust, community chest, fund, or 
foundation will also qualify for a deduction if the organization is created or organized in the United 
State and ―organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or 
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no 
part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of 
cruelty to children or animals.‖ I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(A), (B) (2010). In addition, any net earnings of the 
organization cannot benefit any private shareholder or individual. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(C) (2010). 
Moreover, the organization cannot be ―disqualified for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) by 
reason of attempting to influence legislation, and which does not participate in, or intervene in 
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exceed the annual maximum.
270
 Finally, most donations of less than the 
donor‘s full interest in the property will not qualify for a charitable 
contribution deduction.
271
 Certain partial interests in trust do qualify for 
the charitable deduction if the requirements of section 170(f)(2) are 
followed.
272
  
The Internal Revenue Code includes incentives for charitable giving at 
death as well as during life.
273
 Like the income tax requirements, both the 
estate and gift taxes place the same restrictions on the charitable 
contributions of partial interests in property.
274
 Unlike the income tax, no 
monetary or percentage limits exist to cap the allowable amount of 
deductions under either the gift or estate tax systems.
275
 In order for an 
estate to claim a charitable deduction, the decedent must designate a 
qualified recipient of the charitable donation.
276
 Like the qualifications for 
 
 
(including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in 
opposition to) any candidate for public office.‖ I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D) (2010). Contributions given 
directly to individuals will not qualify for a deduction. Moreover, the donor cannot benefit directly 
from the contribution made to the qualifying recipient. Ottawa Silica Co v. United States, 699 F.2d 
1124, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also Comm‘r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (―[T]he most 
critical consideration . . . is the [donor]‘s intention.‖).  
 270. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(B) (2010). These caps prevent taxpayers from completely avoiding the 
payment of federal income tax by giving all of their income to a qualifying charity. See generally J. 
MARTIN BURKE & MICHAEL K. FRIEL, TAXATION OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME 579 (8th ed. 2007). These 
limitations place a cap on the amount allowed as a deduction; the amount allowed as a deduction 
cannot exceed 50% of the individual‘s ―contribution base,‖ which is generally the taxpayer‘s adjusted 
gross income. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(F) (2010). The amount of the cap depends on the nature of the 
property contributed and the nature of the charitable organization that receives the donation. For most 
charitable contributions, the amount allowed as a deduction cannot exceed 50% of the taxpayer‘s 
contribution base. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) (2010). Caps imposed on capital gain property, as well as 
contributions to organization not listed in section 170(b)(1)(A), are limited to 20% or 30% of a 
taxpayer‘s contribution base. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(C), (D)(i) (2010). 
 271. I.R.C. § 170(f)(3)(A) (2010).  
 272. I.R.C. § 170(f)(2) (2010). A charitable contribution of the remainder interest will qualify for 
a deduction if ―the trust is a charitable remainder annuity trust, or a charitable remainder unitrust, or 
. . . a pooled income fund . . . .‖ I.R.C. § 170(f)(2)(A) (2010). See also John G. Steinkamp, Decoding 
Estate Planning: A Review of Frequently Used Acronyms, 2001 ARK. L. NOTES 73, 74–76 (providing a 
general overview of charitable remainder annuity trust (―CRAT‖) and charitable remainder unitrust 
(―CRUT‖)). A charitable contribution of the income interest will qualify for a deduction if the interest 
―is in the form of a guaranteed annuity or the trust instrument specifies that the interest is a fixed 
percentage distributed yearly of the fair market value of the trust property (to be determined yearly) 
and the grantor is treated as the owner of such interest . . . .‖ I.R.C. § 170(f)(2)(B) (2010). See also 
Steinkamp, supra note 272, at 73–74 (providing a general overview of charitable lead annuity trust 
(―CLAT‖) and charitable lead unitrust (―CLUT‖)). 
 273. See generally I.R.C. §§ 2522, 2055 (2010).  
 274. I.R.C. §§ 2522(c)(2), 2055(e)(2) (2010).  
 275. However, the deduction cannot exceed the value of the property. I.R.C. §§ 2055(d), 2522(a) 
(2010).  
 276. See Estate of Pickard v. Comm‘r, 60 T.C. 618 (1973).  
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a deduction under the income tax structure, only those organizations which 
are listed in section 2055(a) will be a qualified recipient.
277
  
Corporations are also allowed to take advantage of lowering their tax 
liability by making charitable contributions. Section 170(c)(2) provides 
that charitable contributions by a corporation can only be to those 
charitable organizations that operate ―exclusively for religious, charitable, 
scientific, literary, or educational purposes, to foster national or 
international amateur sports competition, or for the prevention of cruelty 
to children or animals.‖278 Therefore, corporations cannot receive a 
deduction for charitable donations made to a state or a political 
subdivision of a state.
279
 The amount of deductions allowed for 
corporations cannot exceed 10% of the total amount of the corporation‘s 
taxable income.
280
  
Federal bankruptcy law plays a small supportive role in the regulation 
of nonprofits. Although it directly regulates only insolvent entities, 
elements of bankruptcy law support charitable giving. The Bankruptcy 
Code includes favorable treatment for transfers to charitable organizations, 
excluding such donations from a debtor‘s ―disposable income,‖ from 
constituting fraudulent conveyances, or from being taken into account in a 
court‘s decision to dismiss or convert a bankruptcy case.281 Underpinning 
 
 
 277. Qualifying organizations include charitable contributions made:  
(1) to or for the use of the United States, any State, any political subdivision thereof, or the 
District of Columbia, for exclusively public purposes;  
(2) to or for the use of any corporation organized and operated exclusively for religious, 
charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, including the encouragement of art, or 
to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its 
activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), and the prevention of 
cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any 
private stockholder or individual, which is not disqualified for tax exemption under section 
501(c)(3) by reason of attempting to influence legislation, and which does not participate in, 
or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign 
on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office;  
I.R.C. § 2055(a) (2010). Qualifying organizations also include donations to a lodge system, but only if 
the lodge system meets the same requirements as corporations must under section 2055(a)(2). I.R.C. 
§ 2055(a)(3) (2010). In addition, contributions made to many veterans‘ organizations will qualify for 
an estate tax deduction, as well as some employee stock ownership plans. I.R.C. § 2055(a)(4)-(5) 
(2010).  
 278. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (2010).  
 279. Id.  
 280. I.R.C. § 170(b)(2)(A) (2010). The corporation‘s taxable income is determined without regard 
to its charitable contributions. I.R.C. § 170(b)(2)(C) (2010).  
 281. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2010), which allows charitable contributions to a 
qualified religious or charitable entity or organization, up to 15% of a debtor‘s gross income, to be 
excluded from ―disposable income‖ for bankruptcy purposes. See also 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (2010), 
which provides charitable contributions to a qualified religious or charitable entity or organization, up 
to certain limitations, are not considered fraudulent transfers for bankruptcy purposes. See also 11 
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this special treatment for charities is a dedication to respecting the 
religious motivations of their donors.
282
  
The majority of federal law that affects nonprofits, however, remains 
tax law. There is no central regulator for the administration of charitable 
activities, and the incentives of the Internal Revenue Code effectively 
serve as primary motivator for appropriate nonprofit behavior. American 
nonprofit regulation seeks to moderate the relationship between the third 
sector and its donors and leaders, and does so primarily through federal tax 
law. 
IV. COMPARATIVE NONPROFIT REGULATION AND THE AMERICAN MODEL  
A. Overview 
The lens of comparative law brings the distinctive features of the 
American approach into a clearer focus. Aspects of the third sector that 
many Americans may take for granted are by no means universal and, in 
fact, are minority approaches. 
The following discussion will address two specific observations about 
how U.S. nonprofit law is distinctive from its European and Asian 
counterparts, and explain how these unique features may be 
interdependent. First, the primary focus of legal regulation in the United 
States is the relationship between the nonprofit and its donors or leaders, 
where the primary focus of most foreign regulation is the relationship 
between the nonprofit and the state. Second, and in a manner that could 
perhaps be related, U.S. law is unusually tax-centric. 
B. The Relational Focus of American Nonprofit Law 
A distinctive feature of the U.S. third sector is the central focus of its 
governmental regulation: the relationship between the nonprofit and its 
leaders and donors. Although a primary feature of regulation in most other 
countries, the relationship between the nonprofit and the government is 
 
 
U.S.C. § 707(b) (2010), which provides that the court may dismiss or convert bankruptcy cases, if 
granting bankruptcy relief would be an abuse of the provisions of the Code, but establishing a special 
rule for charitable contributions: ―In making a determination whether to dismiss a case . . . the court 
may not take into consideration whether a debtor has made, or continues to make, charitable 
contributions . . . to any qualified religious or charitable entity or organization . . . .‖ 
 282. See In re Young, 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 811 (1998), in which 
the court discussed the application of The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (―RFRA‖), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000bb et seq., and held that allowing a bankruptcy trustee to recover tithes to a church would 
substantially burden a debtor‘s free exercise of religion. 
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minimally regulated in the United States and not a central focus of 
nonprofit law. 
Recall that the American system of nonprofit regulation exists at both 
the federal and state levels. At neither level is the primary focus of 
regulation the division of power and control between the first and third 
sectors. Neither state nor federal law plays a significant gate-keeping 
function that would allow government to control the authority and power 
of the third sector. 
States are interested in regulating the relationship between nonprofits 
and donors. States generally require preregistration for nonprofits that will 
be soliciting citizens for funds and will bring actions against charities that 
use fraud or misrepresentation to entice citizens into donations.
283
 Notably, 
state regulation of nonprofit activities is often organized through a state‘s 
Consumer Protection Division.
284
  
States also allocate resources to regulating the relationship between the 
nonprofit and its leaders and beneficiaries. The state Attorney General 
may intervene if a charitable trustee or other leader has breached a 
fiduciary duty, and serves as the official protector of the charitable 
interests of such organizations. Charitable beneficiaries expressly named 
in the trust or other organizational documents may use the power of the 
state (through the Attorney General) to insure compliance with the terms 
of the documents and fiduciary law. 
State nonprofit law plays no substantial gate-keeping role and has only 
modest elements that reflect the relationship between the nonprofit and 
state. Organizing a charitable trust in a state takes no state governmental 
intervention at all.
285
 Organizing a charitable corporation takes only 
minimal filing paperwork, and the state has no regulatory discretion to 
accept or deny incorporation papers, as long as the forms are completed 
appropriately. Although state law may have language that one might 
expect could allow discretion, for example requiring a ―charitable 
purpose‖ for nonprofit incorporation, an organization may merely recite 
that it meets the requirements under state law and will be successfully 
incorporated. 
One small element of state law that acknowledges the relationship 
between the three sectors relates to tax law. Through state property tax 
 
 
 283. See NAT‘L ASS‘N OF STATE CHARITABLE OFFICIALS, supra note 201. 
 284. See id. 
 285. Some states will require that certain charitable trusts, such as those that establish public 
charities, file a copy of their documents with the state; this filing requirement, however, does not 
prevent the organization from existing or operating. 
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exemptions, and the value of these exemptions, states can exert some 
influence on a nonprofit‘s decision to operate in a state.286 These same 
property tax exemptions serve as a mild regulatory force on the 
relationship between the third and second sectors—nonprofits will forfeit 
tax exemptions if their real estate is used for substantial business activity. 
The second small element of the interrelationship between state and 
third sector relates to funding grants. Many nonprofit organizations, 
although by no means all, are dependent upon state grants for funding 
support. A state can demonstrate its commitment to supporting a nonprofit 
organization by awarding it funds, or its disapproval by withdrawing them. 
While state funding is not essential to the survival of many nonprofits, its 
absence does require additional fundraising from private donors or fees 
from charitable activities.
287
 Many nonprofits that receive no funding from 
the state compete ably with those that do (private with state universities, 
for example).  
Like state nonprofit law, federal nonprofit law has little appetite for 
regulating the relationship between government and charity. One small 
aspect of regulatory power that the American federal government 
exercises is through selective grant-making. Entities such as the National 
Endowment for the Arts can, through the power of the dollar, influence the 
activities of certain nonprofits. Organizations that rely upon the American 
government for direct financial grants, however, represent the minority of 
nonprofits. 
As discussed in the next section, federal nonprofit law regulates almost 
exclusively through tax law. The majority of tax laws operate to regulate 
the relationship between the organization and its donors and leaders. There 
are a few elements of federal tax law that address the balance between 
government and nonprofit, but they primarily address their separation 
rather than an allocation of power between them. Charitable organizations 
are essentially required to refrain from directly intervening in a political 
campaign.
288
 They are also limited in the amount of money they can spend 
on lobbying activities.
289
 
 
 
 286. An example is that of a nonprofit hospital or university; an attractive property tax exemption 
might motivate an organization to select or avoid a state for incorporation. 
 287. See Michael Kimmelman, In Europe, The Arts Ask for Alms, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2010, at 
C1 (noting that ―American museum directors these days must spend their careers passing the tin cup, 
but by now government grants in the United States, which were always small, are beholden to special 
interests and awarded to recipients who will offend neither left nor right—so they offer no real 
alternative‖).  
 288. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010). 
 289. See I.R.C. § 509 (2010). 
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American federal tax law briefly addresses the relationship between the 
third sector and the second sector, primarily by eliminating the tax benefit 
for business activities of nonprofits. Charitable organizations that generate 
income based on business activities that are not related to their exempt 
purpose will be subject to tax on that income.
290
 Likewise, nonprofits will 
not qualify to be tax-exempt if their purpose is business rather than 
―charitable.‖291 These rules help define the boundary lines between the 
third and second sectors, but the only penalty for crossing them is tax 
parity rather than tax advantage. 
I have argued that the central focus of American nonprofit law is the 
regulation of the relationship between the nonprofit and its donors and 
leaders. By contrast, I believe the central focus of the law of most other 
countries is the relationship between the nonprofit and the government. 
Regulating the balance of power between the first and third sectors is a 
primary emphasis in European and Asian countries alike. Although it is 
fair to say that all countries to some degree must confront both issues of 
the nonprofit-state relationship and the nonprofit-leader/donor 
relationship, it does appear that America is unique in its lack of dedication 
to the third sector/first sector balance as a primary concern. Perhaps there 
is more overlap between the roles played by government and the third 
sector in Europe and Asia than in America, particularly with respect to 
social services. Whatever the reason, America‘s rather nonchalant attitude 
toward the state/nonprofit dynamic is striking. 
Sweden provides an excellent foil to the United States. Sweden‘s 
regulatory system and approach to the third sector demonstrates a 
commitment to carefully negotiating the balance between state and 
nonprofit.
292
 Swedish society has deliberately shifted the provision of 
many services (now considered ―rights‖) from the third sector to the 
first.
293
 The remaining activities of the third sector often focus on the first 
sector: nonprofits provide coordinated participation in governmental 
policy making, lobby, and even engage directly with the drafting or 
application of laws.
294
 The dynamics of the relationship between the third 
sector and the state are central. 
 
 
 290. See I.R.C. § 512 (2010). 
 291. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010). 
 292. Pestoff, supra note 93, at 63–82.  
 293. Id. at 71. 
 294. Id. at 80. 
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France, distinctive from Sweden in so many ways, shares its 
commitment to regulating the balance between nonprofit and state.
295
 The 
state interest in regulating nonprofits is evident from the recent change in 
governmental structure: the creation of a State Secretary for the Civil and 
Solidarity-based Economy.
296
 There is a high degree of governmental 
regulation, and most nonprofits rely on the state and not individual donors 
for financial support.
297
 France also uses its state regulatory influence over 
the third sector to affect the second sector; the goals of association, self-
organization, and solidarity are supported to offset potential inequities of 
the market.
298
 France remains cognizant of its historical mistrust of 
nonprofits, and dedicated to protecting against interference with the 
relationship between the government and the people.
299
 
Italy, too, has a history of questioning whether intermediaries like 
nonprofits would ―obstruc[t] the direct relationship between the state and 
the citizen.‖300 Although the informal and flexible association and 
cooperative forms currently flourish in Italy,
301
 this is a fairly recent 
development and a deliberative choice to shift the balance of power 
between state and nonprofit. It is also notable that Italian law does not 
insist upon the non-distribution restraint that is central to American federal 
regulation, a notion that focuses on the relationship between the nonprofit 
and its donors and leaders rather than the relationship with the state.
 302
  
Germany also has a primary focus on the balance between the sectors 
and a unique approach to negotiating them.
303
 As discussed above, 
German nonprofits function more as an ―intermediary sphere‖ than a 
―third sector.‖304 It is notable that the role of cooperative nonprofits faded 
when the German government absorbed greater responsibility for welfare 
and economic reform;
305
 this is an example of the shift of regulatory power 
among the sectors. 
Asian countries as well, although distinctive from the European third 
sector in many ways, share the central focus of regulating the 
state/nonprofit relationship.  
 
 
 295. On the French third sector generally, see Chanial & Laville, supra note 21, at 83–99. 
 296. Id. at 96–97. 
 297. Id. at 91. 
 298. Id. at 83–84. 
 299. Id. at 84–88. 
 300. Borzaga, supra note 65, at 49. 
 301. Id. at 55. 
 302. Id. at 61 n.6 (citations omitted). 
 303. Bode & Evers, supra note 45, at 101–21. 
 304. Id. at 101. 
 305. Id. at 106. 
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India has strong reins on its nonprofit sector and substantial regulatory 
force attributed to managing the balance of power between the first sector 
and the third. Voluntary associations are required to register at both the 
federal and local levels, with government officials granted significant 
discretion in granting or withholding approval. The FCRA grants 
significant additional authority to the government in determining the 
existence and operation of nonprofits that depend on foreign funds, which 
is the vast majority.
306
  
Even Bangladesh, with its relatively young and fragile third sector, 
actively confronts the balance of power between the sectors. Nonprofit 
societies must register with the state under the Societies Registration Act, 
and must be granted a license by the government in order to operate. 
Recently, Bangladesh addressed the rights of nonprofits to engage in 
commercial activities—empowering the nonprofits, in part, because of a 
desire to promote national ideals and priorities of the first sector by 
minimizing reliance on contributions from foreign donors.
307
  
Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan are consistent in their regulatory 
priority of moderating how power is shared between the first sector and 
the third. Recall that the Nepalese government retains a right to terminate 
nonprofits, commandeering their assets.
308
 The Sri Lankan government 
also retains broad authority to terminate, take over, or dissolve nonprofits 
on a wide variety of discretionary grounds.
309
 Pakistan wields similar 
control to exercise management takeover rights.
310
 
The relative unimportance in American law of the balance of control 
between nonprofits and government is remarkable when compared to the 
centrality of this issue throughout Europe and Asia. This distinctive 
relational focus is perhaps why the United States regulates nonprofits 
almost exclusively through tax law; additional sources of regulation to 
serve a stronger gate-keeping function are not necessary. 
C. The Tax-Centrism of American Nonprofit Law 
American nonprofit law is predominantly tax law. The U.S. 
government exerts power over its third sector almost exclusively through 
 
 
 306. The Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, No. 49 of 1976, INDIA CODE (2003), available at 
http://www.accountaid.net. 
 307. See Sidel, supra note 107, at 1643. 
 308. Key Themes and Key Choices, supra note 139, at 47 (citing Sinha & Malla, supra note 139, 
at 214). 
 309. Id. (citing Wikramanayake, supra note 139, at 351). 
 310. Id. (citing Ismail & Baig, supra note 139, at 322). 
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the Treasury. Although the government grants valuable tax exemptions to 
entice nonprofit activity (and tax incentives for individual and corporate 
funders to donate to charities), the tax system does little more than 
encourage nonprofit activity and deter substantial abuses.  
The tax system in America functions primarily to (1) protect against 
abuses that affect the relationship between the nonprofit and its donors or 
leaders, and (2) encourage philanthropic gifts. It is perhaps clearest to treat 
these functions in turn. 
Tax law in the United States has a primary focus of regulating the 
relationship between the nonprofit and its donors and leaders, and assuring 
that the benefits of tax-exempt status are not being usurped by a second-
sector entity. This regulation takes the form of requirements to maintain 
exemption from federal income tax by a nonprofit organization. It works 
primarily to regulate the activities of existing charities, and does not play a 
significant gate-keeping role that bars or regulates entry into the third 
sector. Although tax law sets out the requirement of what constitutes a 
charitable or tax-exempt purpose, the standards for exemption are 
reasonably straightforward and leave little room for administrative 
discretion in determining whether a nonprofit meets the criteria.
311
 The 
process for obtaining exemption from federal tax is telling: nonprofits 
apply for recognition of tax-exempt status, rather than tax-exempt status 
itself (the understanding being that their identity entitles them to favorable 
tax treatment, and the application merely demonstrates the facts 
underlying this entitlement).
312
 If the IRS concludes that an application 
does not demonstrate entitlement to tax-exempt status, that decision is 
judicially reviewable; the agency does not have unfettered discretion to 
determine what qualifies as an appropriate addition to the third sector. 
Although federal tax law does not function as a barrier to entry, it does 
function as a deterrent against abuse. Nonprofits can lose their tax-exempt 
status—a valuable commodity—if they operate in a manner that funnels 
profits to insiders or private citizens rather than the charitable class they 
were formed to support. They can also suffer penalty taxes for engaging in 
certain inappropriate transactions with insiders (―excess benefit 
transactions‖) that shift charitable assets to private parties in the form of 
 
 
 311. It could be argued that the United States has some mild authority to affect public policy 
concerns through its conception of what constitutes ―charitable‖ activity; whether racially restrictive 
scholarship grants are permissible is one example. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 
U.S. 574, 592 (1983) (holding it appropriate to deny tax-exempt status to a school whose racial 
discrimination policies were inconsistent with public policy and justice concerns). 
 312. The application for recognition of tax-exempt status is submitted on Form 1023, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1023.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2011). 
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unreasonable compensation, loans, or similar transfers. Private 
foundations are regulated by an additional bevy of rules that protect 
against mismanagement of investments, hoarding of assets, and 
inappropriate expenditures. Tax law is arguably the most efficient tool 
used in America for minimizing abuses in the third sector. 
The secondary function of tax law in America is to motivate charitable 
giving. Tax provisions at multiple levels (income tax and estate tax, for 
example) provide financial incentives for wealthy individual taxpayers to 
make donations to nonprofit organizations. Tax law offers some benefits 
for choosing certain types of nonprofits over others—gifts to public 
charities offer more attractive valuation rules and are subject to more 
generous caps on how much can be deducted—but tax law expresses no 
priorities among various classes of nonprofits. The government does not, 
for example, motivate charitable contributions to health care organizations 
by offering a larger deduction for gifts to hospitals than for gifts to 
universities or the local belly-dance performance troupe. 
It is surprising and not terribly well-justified that tax law is central to 
American nonprofits.
313
 Why should the central regulatory force be the 
Treasury? The primary purpose of tax law is ostensibly raising revenue; 
surely that is not the primary function here, as much revenue is forgone. 
The main reasons for using the Treasury as regulatory center seems to be 
that money talks, and that the system (largely) works. On a structural 
level, though, housing national oversight of the third sector in the Treasury 
is counterintuitive. 
 
 
 313. The comparative analysis of this Article lends support to the argument that exclusive 
regulation by the Treasury is questionable. Commentators have criticized this source of regulation and 
argued for reform. See, e.g., Marion R. Fremont-Smith, The Search for Greater Accountability of 
Nonprofit Organizations: Recent Legal Developments and Proposals for Change, 76 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 609, 641, which notes that: 
The role of the IRS as regulator of tax-exempt entities has long been subject to question by 
commentators, government officials, and practitioners. Proposals to create a new agency to 
regulate charities, some modeled on the English Charity Commissioners, some on the 
Securities and Exchange Commission or the quasi-governmental bodies which operate in 
conjunction with it, have been considered. 
Suggestions for reform include modest proposals to increase funding to more dramatic change in the 
locus of regulation and enforcement. Id. One former director of the IRS Exempt Organizations 
Division advocated the latter kind of change: 
[He] suggested moving enforcement to a new agency modeled on the National Association of 
Securities Dealers . . . . This would be a quasi-public agency, financed in part by credits 
against the excise tax on private foundations or a licensing fee, operating in conjunction with 
the IRS as the National Association of Securities Dealers does, with the new body granting 
exemptions and receiving and reviewing annual reports. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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Few other countries share America‘s commitment to tax as the center 
of nonprofit law. In some countries, tax plays no role at all. In those where 
it does, tax is rarely the central regulating force or source of federal 
authority. 
A more balanced approach is illustrated by Bangladesh. Tax does play 
a role in the law of nonprofits there, and the importance of tax benefits is 
perhaps growing. It is notable, however, that tax law in Bangladesh 
involves a level of discretionary decision-making that American tax law 
does not.
314
 Bangladesh also has a system of licenses that must be granted 
by governmental authorities for a nonprofit to conduct activities. 
Bangladesh therefore has an additional resource to exercise the gate-
keeping function that tax law does not appear sufficient to offer.  
India, likewise, adopts a model where tax is more supporting actress 
than leading lady. True, nonprofit organizations are exempt from certain 
federal taxes, and individuals receive incentives in the form of deductions 
to make charitable gifts.
315
 The primary source of regulatory authority, 
however, rests in the Ministry of Home Affairs, with the granting of 
licenses at various levels of government, and through the FCRA. 
Countries in Europe, likewise, often integrate tax only as a minor 
aspect of their nonprofit regulatory scheme. Tax is clearly not the 
backbone of the law of the third sector in Sweden; there is no income tax 
incentive for charitable contributions.
316
 Italy‘s modest tax benefits that 
encourage philanthropic institutions and their donors are neither central to 
the government‘s regulatory force nor significant.317 France has allowed 
charitable income tax deductions for donations to nonprofits only 
recently;
318
 tax is hardly the center of its regulatory scheme. Germany 
follows suit, offering some tax incentives for charity,
319
 but exerting other 
regulatory force—including the reliance upon the government for 
nonprofit funding—rather than bare reliance upon tax law.320 
 
 
 314. ASIA PAC. PHILANTHROPY CONSORTIUM, PHILANTHROPY AND LAW IN SOUTH ASIA—
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BANGLADESH, INDIA, NEPAL, PAKISTAN AND SRI LANKA 15 (Sept. 2007). 
 315. The Income Tax Act, No. 43 of 1961, amended by Finance Act, No. 32 of 2003 INDIA CODE 
(2003); see also Sidel, supra note 107, at 1619. 
 316. Benshalom, supra note 100.  
 317. Borzaga, supra note 65, at 46, 54. 
 318. ARCHAMBAULT, supra note 40, at 69.  
 319. Germany allows for exemption from tax for nonprofits as well as charitable deductions for 
donors. COUNCIL ON FOUNDATIONS, U.S. INTERNATIONAL GRANTMAKING—GERMANY, supra note 
52, at 8–9.  
 320. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
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European law, however, may become increasingly ―Americanized‖ 
when it comes to tax incentives for charities.
321
 A recent article in the New 
York Times discussed the increased willingness of governments in 
Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain to use tax incentives to shift the 
funding of nonprofits from the state to private donors.
322
 These decisions 
are made with acknowledgement of the release of regulatory power such a 
shift would entail: 
Didier Alaime, who represents the Confédération Générale du 
Travail, the country‘s biggest union, in its dealings with the Culture 
Ministry, said the other day that ―the more public policies are 
dependent on private financing, the more they risk feeling the ups 
and downs of the market.‖ He added, ―The more we‘re dependent 
on outside financing, the less we‖—he was speaking about the 
people of France—―control the policies that are financed.‖323  
Should the law in Europe migrate toward an American tax-centrism? A 
nonprofit regulatory regime that centers on tax is consistent with a laissez-
faire approach to managing the balance of power between the third sector 
and the state; this perspective does not seem consistent with the historical 
treatment of nonprofits in Europe. 
V. CONCLUSION: IMPROVING AMERICAN NONPROFIT LAW THROUGH 
COMPARATIVE LAW INSIGHTS 
The vibrancy of the third sector in Europe and Asia is a gentle 
reminder that the American way is not the only way. There is much in the 
American system of nonprofit regulation that we take for granted; we 
ought to question more. The comparative analysis of this Article highlights 
the idiosyncrasies of the American approach; we should now determine 
whether these distinctive features serve us well. The current wave of 
interest in nonprofit law as a distinct area of study offers a unique 
opportunity to improve the American third sector. Nonprofit law may 
operate in a silo, as too many areas of law do, or may benefit from the 
broader view that an international and interdisciplinary approach can offer. 
Although countries in South Asia are in many ways struggling with 
their philanthropic identity, they have some advantages over—or at least 
lessons for—the United States. Perhaps the greatest advantage South 
 
 
 321. See Kimmelman, supra note 287.  
 322. See id. 
 323. Id. 
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Asian nonprofit law has over the American approach is its self-
consciousness. As developing countries, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, 
Nepal, and Sri Lanka give greater deliberative attention to the choices they 
make in the governance of the third sector. Because of their awareness of 
the growth and development of the nonprofit sector, these countries seem 
more attuned to the big-picture issues: the balance of power between 
charity and state; the tension between wanting third-sector solutions and 
maintaining governmental controls; the roles society wants and expects the 
third sector, as opposed to the government, to play; and the proper balance 
between enabling and encouraging philanthropy and regulating and 
controlling it (both to limit abuses and to maintain political objectives). It 
stands to reason that countries that consciously address these challenges 
will resolve them more efficiently than ones that assume the answers are 
already resolved. 
Europe, likewise, offers lessons for the U.S. third sector. The rich civil 
histories of France, Germany, and Italy contribute to their dedication to 
respecting the relationship between citizen and state, and guarding against 
interference, even from nonprofits. The perspective of Sweden, which 
focuses on the rights of individuals rather than the beneficence of donors, 
is also illuminating. The balance of power between the first and third 
sectors, and the role of each in responding to citizens‘ needs, is carefully 
negotiated. 
The unique relational focus of American law raises questions as to how 
deliberately we have determined the balance of power between the three 
sectors. What should the relative weight of the voluntary sector be, 
compared to the government and market sectors? Does American 
government retain any interest in influencing this balance, or should 
society (or the market?) determine the balance itself? Ought there be 
barriers to entry, exercised by the government, for nonprofit associations? 
Or is the proper focus of nonprofit law the relationship between the 
nonprofit and its donors and leaders, such that the relationship to the state 
is appropriately only an afterthought? 
The tax-centric nature of American philanthropy law raises additional 
concerns. Is it justified to regulate nonprofits (almost) exclusively through 
the Treasury?
324
 What stake has the Treasury in the voluntary sector, as 
opposed to other agencies of federal government? Should state or federal 
government create additional avenues for regulation? 
 
 
 324. See Fremont-Smith, supra note 313, at 641. 
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This Article has not taken on the heavy burden of answering these 
questions, but seeks only to demonstrate how the current status of 
American nonprofit law suggests that we ask them. Perhaps the greatest 
lesson that comparative law affords is the insight that there can be many 
different, good solutions to the same problems. Greater deliberative 
attention to the choices American law makes with respect to the third 
sector will enhance its ability to serve the role we want in our society. We 
have perhaps taken too much for granted, and should not be afraid to 
question.  
In comparative perspective, American nonprofit law exhibits much 
peculiarity. Perhaps these idiosyncrasies are not only defensible but 
integral to our distinctive approach to the third sector. Nonetheless, 
consideration of the myriad international solutions to nonprofit regulation 
should be undertaken with humility and respect. A comparative 
perspective may enhance not only our understanding of the American 
system of nonprofit regulation, but openness to its continued 
improvement. 
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